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# ***JPRS Report***

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## **East Europe**

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# East Europe

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Havel Comments on Mitterrand's Visit

29000006a Paris LE MONDE in French 2 Dec 88 p 2

[Article by Vaclav Havel; first paragraph is editor's comment]

[Text] With his visit to Prague on 8 and 9 December, Francois Mitterrand begins a visit to Eastern Europe. Vaclav Havel, a writer and cofounder of Charter 77, sent us the thoughts this visit inspired in him.

Before the visit of Francois Mitterrand to Czechoslovakia, I would like to draw attention to the sad situation prevailing in our country. I wish the president would keep it in mind during his meetings in Prague and would discuss it openly with our representatives.

I am far from accusing the French president of political naivete. However, it seems to me that his visit is so important politically and so easily capable of being represented by our leaders as definitive proof of unanimous respect for their policies that I feel the need once again to underline the regrettable contradiction between the face they show to their foreign guests and that which they show to their own people.

Compared to the policies of the Soviet, Hungarian, and even Polish authorities, the policies of our leaders are extremely conservative. Our leaders also speak of restructuring and of democratization. However, they are only trying to dress their old, totalitarian methods in new clothing. Unfortunately, this new language only masks one thing: the desire to safeguard at any price the power of those who were put in their present positions by Brezhnev's tanks 20 years ago, against the will of the people, and who, since that time, have been destroying this country.

Whereas in other countries of the Soviet bloc one can see at least a desire to improve things, in Czechoslovakia the economic, ecological, social, and moral crisis has merely been aggravated a little more. Life here is empty, limited, and oppressive. It is made up daily of discreet but complex humiliation of human beings. Our leaders obstinately refuse to begin any kind of dialogue with society. They cling desperately to the conviction that they will succeed in postponing the final catastrophe, to which the present crisis is inevitably leading, until the moment when their age will deliver them to the point where everything that is of this earth will be a matter of indifference to them.

Long ago Czechoslovak society became aware of the impasse to which these policies are leading. Even further, people dare to show this more and more clearly. Under present circumstances the consequences have been inevitable: Every attempt to express themselves freely has then been suppressed. Independent initiatives, such as Charter 77, are again subject to crude persecution. The

cruder the persecution the more it has become clear that these independent groups are no longer made up of a few, isolated handfuls of eternal malcontents but rather constitute a movement that says out loud what the majority of the people are thinking in secret. They have a broader range of support than ever among the public, as recent demonstrations have shown. Of course, these have been brutally suppressed.

Those who hold power and their omnipresent police forces have become increasingly hysterical. Representatives of a peaceful, independent association have been imprisoned for having organized a peaceful demonstration on the occasion of the anniversary of the establishment of our country. Ivan Jirous, the poet, was arrested, as was Jiri Tichy, both of them because they expressed their indignation over the death of Pavel Wonka in prison. Ivan Polansky, Petr Cibulka, and Dusan Skala were imprisoned for having distributed independent publications.

At a time when Imre Pozsgay, one of the leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party, announced that the leading role of the party would no longer be stated in the new Hungarian constitution, in our country lawsuits were undertaken against the new Movement for Civic Liberty, which proposed the same thing. A court decided that Augustin Navratil, the author of a Catholic petition signed by a half million citizens and approved by the primate of Bohemia, will be held in a psychiatric hospital. Courageous people have been thrown into prison. Symposiums of experts have been interrupted by force. Independent newspapers have been persecuted. The police have carried out interrogations and searches and have threatened and engaged in blackmail. Thousands of artists, journalists, and university professors are still unable to work in their respective disciplines.

The same ineffective and, at times, almost illiterate bureaucracy continues to direct all authorized cultural activity. They even refuse our citizens the right to learn that our government is planning to make money in hard currencies by importing toxic waste from the West.

Everything that displeases the present authorities or that resists their manipulation is called "antisocialist" and, therefore, considered hostile. From now on, among those elements considered "antisocialist" will be not only those who advocate the idea of political pluralism or the economists who criticize the absurd, centralized management of the whole economy, not only those who advocate defending political prisoners (my friends and I myself spent several years in prison for this "crime."), but also a singer who sang of the dying forests or an old man who, on the (officially celebrated) 70th birthday of the Czechoslovak republic, pasted on his window the picture of its first president. Naturally, even Mitterrand, representative of a socialist party, would be considered antisocialist in this country.



It goes without saying that our leaders will not let any of this come up in the course of the meetings. At most they will mention "small groups of dissidents" who are poisoning the atmosphere by trying to block the promising processes of restructuring and democratization. That is not true. In the first place, restructuring and democratization have been blocked by the leadership of our country and by the enormous bureaucratic apparatus, which does not wish to give up its privileges. Restructuring and democratization have been blocked by people who were not elected freely and who fear that the least sign of democratization will be a threat to their power. Of course, these people also speak of human rights. However, what they are doing gives the impression that only one "right" is of interest to them: their right to manipulate our society.

I am convinced that Mitterrand is already aware of the specific elements of the situation I am describing. I firmly believe that, as the highest representative of a country that has a long, democratic tradition and symbolizes true freedom of thought, he will not be silent about what is going on in Czechoslovakia today. I hope that his visit will not support the legitimacy and the validity of the policies of our leaders. That would do harm to our people and certainly would not contribute to detente in Europe.

**Ecological Soundness of Danube Dam Defended**  
24000035 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 2 Dec 88 p 6

[Article by Gejza Vilcek: "Clean Water Into the Danube"]

[Text] The fears of the Hungarian people about the ecological consequences the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros waterworks might cause stem from many years of experience that, as a rule, the so-called supplemental investments are appendages that are the last to be built, and that sufficient funds are not always left for them. Naturally, the opposition to the waterworks construction follows also many other—even political—objectives, but precisely this point contains the legendary "grain of truth." Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, a modern construction project with no negligible, nonessential factors, will produce the anticipated effects only when it is completely and totally finished.

As a matter of fact, it should be noted that already the initial plan considered its ecological ramifications and that it was no coincidence that the construction on its Czechoslovak side started with the preservation, stripping and storing of the fertile topsoil layer, so that once the waterworks are completed, the soil could be spread again in their vicinity. Even the interstate agreement on the waterworks contains a passage to the effect that the plans must be continuously updated with ecological facilities in accordance with the latest scientific data. For that purpose, an appropriate contingency fund has been set aside in the budget for the construction.

It is impossible to create two huge lakes on the Danube so that the polluted waste waters would flow in them and turn the reservoirs into pools for silt deposits. Of course, such an idea did not occur to the current critics of the construction project, but to its authors and planners long before the launching of the construction operations. For that reason, waste water purification plants are under construction also on the Hungarian side.

Let us follow the stream of the Danube from the Mosonmagyaróvár in the northwestern area of Hungary. A biological purification plant has already been built there and its test run is underway. Its daily capacity is 6,000 cubic meters. Because the town's sewer system has only 60 percent capacity, the purification plant is for the time being processing 4,300 cubic meters per day, and therefore, any potential flaws and defects that may appear during the trial run will cause no stoppages. As the deputy manager of the purification plant, László Gábor, informs us, the water released into the river is within normal parameters.

The center of this area, the city of Győr, has advanced industry. The manager of the department in charge of the administration for environmental protection and water economy, Zoltán B. Kovács, reports that 21 factories in Győr were given a mandatory deadline to build before 1991 temporary purification plants for waters released to the new purification plant in Győr. The factories are not enthusiastic about this decision because it takes a bite from their investment funds. However, the paper mill in the community of Lábán has demonstrated an exemplary attitude. It introduced a developmental program based on waste purification and recycling. Thus, it is simultaneously an industrial and ecological investment.

The new purification plant in Győr is now under construction on the outskirts of Bács. In its first stage, a filtering station, and in its second stage, a biological purification plant with daily capacity of 80,000 cubic meters will be built. The first stage will be completed next year. In the area of the waterworks construction on the Hungarian side, 40 percent of waste waters are from Győr and therefore, 100 million forint will be invested there in a biological purification plant in the Eighth 5-Year Plan, with the remaining 650 million to be invested during this 5-Year Plan.

The waterworks will make the purification plants and sewer systems accessible even to small towns sooner than their own resources would permit. In the city of Esztergom, a bypass for waste waters, now under construction, and a mechanical purification plant with daily capacity of 12,000 cubic meters will cost 175 million forint.

Four purification plants are planned in the Komárom region whose center is Tatabánya. Bids for a purification plant are only now being accepted in the city of Komárom, because the existing plant is still operating. However, the capacity of the new plant will be 6,000 cubic meters. Directly in Tatabánya the construction of a



6,000 cubic meter plant will be completed during this 5-year plan; a 7,000 cubic meter purification plant which will be built in the next 5-year plan will be furnished with the so-called chemical stage. The capacity of the purification plant in the mining area of Oroszlany will only be expanded to 6,000 cubic meters. The capacities of all purification plants are planned to facilitate the processing not only of waste waters from the sewer network, but also of the offal from village cesspools.

In addition to purification plants, the project involves the construction of a water main and sewer network in the neighboring areas, which means an unprecedented expansion of the infrastructure in several communities and settlements. Those facilities are important also for agriculture, because they permit the water from large reservoirs to be used for irrigation. In the Komarom region, the greatest expansion of the infrastructure is concentrated in the towns and communities of Esztergom, Tat, Almasfuzito, Koppa-Nymonostor, Pilismarot, and Domos, where dikes are being built for a station which will continuously monitor the ecological parameters. The state secretary for environmental protection and water economy, Miklos Varga, said that the building of purification plants would use the latest technology and for that reason, foreign companies would participate in the project. Some contractors from the Federal Republic of Germany, particularly the Thyssen Company, have already expressed their interest.

It is typical for ecological investments on the Hungarian part of the waterworks that in its session last autumn the Hungarian National Assembly adopted a decision according to which the hydroelectric plants may begin operation at full speed only after the purification facilities are completed. Therefore, a dam, a power plant and the locks may be built, but there will be no lake near Nagymaros until clean waters flow into the river in that area. In this particular case, ecological facilities are no afterthoughts or incidentals to the waterworks, but obligations and prerequisites for their operation.

Thus, as the state secretary Miklos Varga stated at a recent session of the executive committee of the regional council in Tatabanya, the deadline for the completion of the waterworks is not contingent on the deadline for the dam and for the power plants, but on the completion of all the planned purification plants.

**Unofficial T.G. Masaryk Society Attacked**  
24000033 Brno ROVNOST in Czech 24 Oct 88 p 2

[Article by (ot): "About One Would-Be Initiative"]

[Text] As the day approaches when the 70th anniversary of the founding of our independent Czechoslovak state will be celebrated, one can hear some voices attempting to take advantage of this historical milestone so memorable for both our nations.

On the roster of these endeavors, which have very little in common with the real substance of patriotism and socialism, is the so-called independent initiative that calls itself "T.G. Masaryk Society." The name of T.G. Masaryk was not chosen haphazardly but because of his indisputable merits in the revolt against Austria and in the founding of an independent Czechoslovakia. When assessing Masaryk and other personages, one must bear in mind historical events that sparked the revolutionary movement of great national masses—above all, the Great October Revolution and the end of World War I.

Under the title "T.G. Masaryk Society" hides a little band of individuals from Prague and Brno, whose program is popular and seemingly innocuous—to help preserve the legacy of the first president of the Czechoslovak Republic, T.G. Masaryk. Under this guise they claimed their share in the celebrations commemorating the 70th anniversary of the CSR's founding. For instance, they openly demanded an invitation to the reviewing stand during the celebrations for political figures from the pre-1948 era, for example, for Josef Poslednik, mayor of the City of Brno in 1946-48, and other persons. Who in fact is Josef Poslednik? He was deputy chairman of the former National Socialist Party's regional committee. He was sentenced for his antistate activity, and then he compromised himself during the period of crisis in the 1960's as a member of the executive council of the K-321, an organization whose objectives need no further discussion.

The manner in which they intend to participate in the above-mentioned celebrations is illustrated by a recent case of incendiary leaflets that appeared in our city. It may be interesting to take a closer look at individuals who helped with their copying and distribution—for example, the members and supporters of the so-called Charter 77, and also juveniles prone to alcoholism and drug addiction.

To complete the overall picture, one should mention also the support and publicity of their aspirations by Western centers of ideological subversion. What then is their goal? It is crystal clear—to spoil the dignity of official celebrations held on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic.

**Stalin's Fame Survives**  
26000229 Warsaw TYGODNIOWY BIULETYN  
SPECJALNY in Polish 15 Oct 88 pp V-VI

[Text] PAP correspondent Leszek Mazan writes:

In the town of Sumperk in Moravia, in the spring of this year, a stone, giant-size statue of Joseph Stalin disappeared overnight. The residents of Sumperk associated this disappearance with the process of rebuilding and "glasnost," now taking place. But after 3 months Stalin returned to town, except that he had been painstakingly restored and was placed on a more conspicuous site.



Statues of Joseph Vissarionovich are still found in Ostrava, Olomouc, and Litomerice. In Prague, as I already wrote, Stalin St continues to appear on a newly published map of the city. In some—many—government offices his portraits still hang. The press, which sometimes reprints articles from Soviet newspapers describing crimes from the Stalinist period, is very cautious in its choice of excerpts, and in giving them titles is careful that they contain no elements of "sensationalism." In the recently produced CSSR television series, shown a year ago, Stalin, on hearing the news that Klement Gottwald, visiting in Moscow, had suddenly become ill, falls into real despair and, in a dramatic voice, shouts into the telephone: "Make everying available immediately, including the best doctors, to save comrade Gottwald!"

Such a presentation of a person, elsewhere called more and more often either the biggest or one of the biggest murderers in the history of mankind, must shock or at least surprise not only foreigners but also the citizens of Czechoslovakia themselves. Although since 1968 nothing has been published in this country concerning the enormity of the repression of the Stalinist times, the knowledge of the tragedy remains in the memories of many citizens, and not just those who have never been rehabilitated or their families. The number of political and unjustly sentenced prisoners during 1948-54 has been estimated at about 80,000; if we add to that the prisoners of over 400 labor camps, interned without sentencing, the figure will probably be between 130,000 and 150,000. The waves of repression; the denigration, to one rank, of an experienced, sometimes excellent cadre in the army, among the intellectuals, and in the party apparatus; the wave of political trials and death sentences already began in the spring of 1948. Proportionally to the number of residents, the repressions affected more people than in Poland. But there were no events big enough to rise to the rank of symbols: Czechoslovakia did not have its 17 September 1939—this role was fulfilled by the Munich Pact. It did not have Katyn or deportations to Siberia. If we do not count the loss of Carpathian Russia (Vasil Bilak spoke recently of its annexation to the USSR as an example of historical justice), Czechoslovakia was rebuilt after the war within the pre-1938 boundaries. The Czechs also had a traditional pro-Russian, and then pro-Soviet, orientation. The USSR was presented as an "unmatched example," and numerous slogans to this day are seen in many streets and homes, crying "With the Soviet Union for all time and never otherwise."

But the difference in the treatment of the person of Stalin in Czechoslovakia and the USSR is the subject of more and more frequent, although not reflected in the press, discussions and talks. This phenomenon must be becoming more universal, because RUDE PRAVO decided to make a public reply to a reader who, at a meeting with newspaper editors, asked "Does the statue of Stalin continue to stand in Litomerice through oversight?"

The figure of Stalin occupies a permanent place in the history of mankind and it must be discussed. We cannot

forget about it as, in the past, we forgot about many deceased Soviet leaders, said the assistant to the editor in chief of RUDE PRAVO, Kojzar. This discussion is a duty, for it reminds us of the dangers flowing from the cult of the individual. This was made very clear in the USSR at the 20th Congress and in Gorbachev's speech at the ceremonies of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution.

In listing—with frequent references to Gorbachev—Stalin's countless services in the struggle with Trotskyism, in overcoming the difficulties in the industrialization era, in the war with the Germans, etc., the daily states that some of the methods employed by Joseph Vissarionovich have been condemned by the present Soviet leader. Therefore, in judging Stalin we must take into account both his contributions to the building of socialism and the mistakes that he made. In passing an opinion, we must also take into account the circumstances—that, after all, he alone did not make the "serious political errors" that so greatly affected the Soviet society. Gorbachev called for objectivism in judging Stalin, and this is the right position to take, added another RUDE PRAVO editor, reminding that in the USSR the discussion on this subject is still going on.

As we see, these are more than cautious statements. None of the editors of the central party newspaper expressed even one word of personal judgment of Stalin, employing Gorbachev's quotations exclusively. Therefore, everything points to the fact that the "Stalins" will not disappear in the CSSR. On the contrary, the opportunities to remind us how much Czechoslovakia owes to Joseph Vissarionovich become more numerous. Demonstration of the right to present opinions other than those expressed in the USSR serves, it seems, to emphasize the continuity of the political line of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Both Husak and Jakes have said several times that "reconstruction in the CSSR is the creative development of the system that has existed since 1948." An attack on Stalin, even in the form of removing his monuments, would therefore be a kind of denial of the correctness of the Communist Party concept, an invitation to deeper reforms of the systems. Or: That which we can today be proud of was born in pain that was often impossible to avoid. Let us not open up the wounds that have already healed. Let us go forward along the same path, because experience teaches that it is the right one.

#### **Industrial Enterprises Hesitant To Support Culture**

24000036 Prague RUDE PRAVO in: Czech 1 Dec 88 p 5

[Article by Zdenka Lehka: "What Chances Are There for Culture?"]

[Text] Panicky articles on the topic of culture and grants are appearing at a steadily increasing rate. Experts on cultural matters are discussing this problem all over our republic. Despite all efforts to find an acceptable compromise, the controversies between the production and



nonproduction spheres—in the given case, culture—keep multiplying. The report of the Presidium to the 10th session of the CPCZ Central Committee mentioned the struggle with attitudes rooted in the so-called leftover principle, where only the leftovers are earmarked for social or cultural purposes. This formulation aptly characterizes the current situation of that branch which in addition is affected by the gradual changes of our national economic management system. Our enterprises are concentrating on economy, in other words, on the creation of resources which will ensure their independent management on the basis of the *khozraschet* principle. If at the same time they fail to fulfill the basic indicators of their plans, then after the mandatory payments to the state budget they will have no assets left for public services consumption. This influences the attitude of our enterprises to cultural institutions per se and also to the collection of funds designated for cultural development, not to mention the programs of national committees which meet their obligations to culture only sporadically. The Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee discussed the document "The Tasks of National Committees in the Development of Socialist Democratization and in the Restructuring of the Economic Mechanism" which specifies the future prospects of independent management by national committees in specific territorial areas; this should have a favorable effect on our cultural development.

In the current situation, our enterprises still take advantage of an option offered them by decree of the Federal Ministry of Finance No 90/1986 of the Collection of Laws. Although the text of that decree specifies what resources the enterprises may use to the benefit of the cultural sphere, but by the same token, its very formulation does not explicitly stipulate that organizations collect funds for activities to which this decree entitles them. The enterprises are using such "loopholes" to shirk their current obligations. This has stymied not only the programs of our cultural institutions, but also of many amateur art groups which are now threatened with the loss of their funding. Some managers are going so far as to check the profitability of cultural institutions and of amateur art groups. A number of enterprises profit from the vague formulation of decree No 90/1986 of the Collection of Laws, especially, for instance, the general directorate of the Ferrous Metallurgy Works, the Skoda National Enterprise in Pilsen, the East Slovakia Iron Works in Kosice, the Klement Gottwald New Metallurgical Works, and others. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions. In the second year of the experiment, for instance, the Czechoslovak Musical Instruments Sectoral Enterprise created sufficient assets to consolidate its economic and material position. At the same time, however, it successfully developed a social program and granted considerable funds to strengthen the cultural sphere. It intends to continue its participation in international and domestic music festivals by cooperating with schools of folk art, and by creating opportunities for apprentices and employees of amateur art groups.

Many institutions and agencies have expressed their views on the proposal of the law on enterprise social services consumption, which should stipulate in unambiguous terms the share of enterprises in the creation of funds for cultural programs. However, so long as vague formulations are not clarified during the discussions at preliminary hearings, our enterprises will be able to find again some loopholes, and our culture will lose the chances still open to it.

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

### Environmental Group Complains to FRG Minister

23000056 Hamburg DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT in German 13 Nov 88 p 32

[Exchange of letters between Mathias Voigt, "Arche," Green Network of the Evangelical Church of the GDR, Berlin-Brandenburg Region, dated 25 October 1988, and Karlheinz Weimar, environmental minister of Hesse, dated 4 November 1988 (excerpted)]

[Text]

Dear Minister Weimar:

As the GDR provides no public information on the disposition and handling of refuse, we unfortunately found out rather belatedly about the intended contract between Hesse and our republic and so could not react any earlier.

We are frightened by this matter that frivolously toys with the health of thousands of GDR citizens. What you may perhaps not know is that the standards for refuse neutralization in the GDR are in no way comparable to those in the FRG. The most elemental prerequisites are lacking for any harmless disposition. Especially in the region of Schoeneiche and in Deetz, where the Hessian special and domestic refuse and the sediments are dumped, soon to be incinerated, large-scale air and ground water pollution must be expected.

As far as we could make out, there is no base sealing at all—neither in the Schoeneiche plain landfill nor in the hopelessly overstuffed pit in Deetz, or in Schoenberg. Even deposits now planned, such as that in Leppin, do not provide for such a minimum measure for protecting the ground water. Especially affected by it is the Schoeneiche region, where the Hessian refuse is to go. (...) The latest refuse drums that were found clearly came from Switzerland and Italy. Unfortunately we could not find out what content it was that was so mysteriously contained in them. GDR authorities either don't care about it or are indifferent. The greed for foreign exchange alone governs their acts. The twaddle GDR authorities have come up with about control vessels allegedly installed to safeguard the ground water must not satisfy you in calming your conscience. (...)



Our green network, an overall territorial affiliation of various ecological groups, appeals to you to renounce this dangerous and hazardous refuse dumping in our country on behalf of the GDR citizens. If you and your party friends are really serious about the much-touted improvements between East and West, especially for the GDR citizens, then dump the Hessian refuse in Hesse, please. If unwilling to do so, then please at least also supply the most environmentally efficient neutralization systems at the most up-to-date technological standards.

[Mathias Voigt]

Ladies and Gentlemen:

A Frankfurt monthly passed on to me an open letter with your return address. I would like to use that occasion to do away with some apparent misunderstandings. I do take your concerns seriously. But I have been taken aback by your reproach of "frivolously toying with the health of thousands of GDR citizens."

First and foremost, we shall send no special refuse to Schoeneiche or Deetz. I know even by exporting domestic refuse from Hesse to the GDR we are taking a most problematic course. In principle it is absolutely self-evident to me that each country has to solve such problems itself. I can, however, not do away at short shrift with the consequences of decisions postponed for years and, hence, the lack of dumping capacities here. For a limited time only and only for unavoidable volumes we, therefore, must accept the bids presented by the competent GDR organization. We deliberately picked up solutions already found for West Berlin so that, in principle, nothing new is taking place there. We yet have ascertained, in line with our legal obligation, what the standards are by which the dumping takes place in the GDR. Our specialists are in touch about that with their GDR colleagues.

We also know that the Schoeneiche landfill in the GDR, intended for domestic refuse, has a natural base sealing in the form of an adequately thick clay stratum. There is, to be sure, no technically installed secondary base sealing with drainage pickup, yet that has even in our place been a condition for authorizing such dumping for only a few years.

As far as we know, the Schoeneiche pit is neither better nor worse than domestic refuse dumping grounds authorized at this time and in continued use in Hesse. So I am convinced that, under these technical conditions, including those for the requisite protection of the GDR citizens' health, the dumping of domestic refuse in the Schoeneiche pit in the GDR is perfectly justifiable. I would find unjustifiable, as you do, the idea of settling dumping permanently by way of exports. I assure you that, also in connection with the coming amendment of the Hessian refuse law, I shall do all I can to restrain the export of domestic refuse from Hesse to the GDR. Still, your frank words are being appreciated.

[Karlheinz Weimar]

### FRG Analysis of Motives for New Policy Toward Jews

23000047 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
ALLGEMEINE in German 19 Nov 88 p 12

[Article by Ralf Georg Reuth: "New Tunes, Old Objectives—The 'New Course' in the GDR Toward Jews and Other Religious Communities"]

[Text] Berlin, November—Without incidence, East Berlin celebrated the 50th anniversary of the anti-Semitic pogroms. In many places, the occasion was dignified after a silence that lasted 40 years. Is there a new attitude apparent in the atheistic communist state towards the Jews, and recently also toward Mormons and Adventists?

In fact, what is happening beyond the Wall and barbed wire is nothing other than a calculated orchestration of the Jews and the million victims among them during the National Socialist tyranny. Just as the SED, with the help of an anti-Semitic campaign at the beginning of the 1950's knew how to largely drive out Jews from their own ranks, it now pursues, after more than 30 years of uninterrupted anti-Zionist propaganda, three political objectives with a pro-Jewish campaign initiated a year and a half ago.

The demonstrative support of Jews in the GDR, numbering far fewer than a thousand organized in communities, is intended to divert attention from the mounting difficulties with the Protestant church in parallel with a new attitude—presented with just as much media effect—toward the small Christian religious communities of American origin, the Adventists and the Mormons. In spite of all the effort, the SED so far has not succeeded in containing dissatisfaction with conditions in the GDR, which is taking shape under church roofs.

The pro-Jewish campaign, intended to suggest an image of the GDR open on religious issues, also serves—with focus on the FRG—to display "anti-Fascist consciousness." As an example, in connection with the furore around the Jenninger speech in the Bundestag, the SED's official party publication NEUES DEUTSCHLAND once again portrays the bogeyman of an ubiquitous West German "neofascism," in order to bring together, in defense against this specter, parties, organizations, and groups that otherwise would never come together.

Which goal such "action alliances" are to serve is evident from a recently published commentary of WAHRHEIT, the party publication of the West Berlin SED offshoot. There it reads, with focus on the union: "Anyone who as a conclusion from the time of fascism can merely propose that bourgeois-democratic forms of power are to be established and preserved, pushes aside the most important lesson: precisely the need for depriving of their power those who in 1933 transferred power to the



fascists." According to the communists' conception of history this meant the big capitalists and their "political henchmen" whose power had been broken with the creation of the first socialist state in the GDR alone.

Finally and third, the SED, by means of the change of course toward the Jews in the GDR—which is more talk than (paying) actions—wants to pave the way with the Jews on the other side of the Atlantic (the changed attitude toward the few Mormons living in the GDR, while about 4 million are estimated to live in North America, serves the same objective) for a state visit in the United States by the SED general secretary. After his visits in Bonn and Paris, this would mean the final step for Honecker on the long road of the SED regime from shunned outsider to internationally recognized ruler in Central Germany.

A success for the SED campaign would surely be more difficult to achieve were it not for certain leading representatives of the Jewish religious community. Be it the president of the Jewish World Congress, Bronfman, who recently in East Berlin was awarded the "Star of Friendship among Nations" by SED boss Honecker, be it the chairman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Galinski, who is now honored with the same medal, or the president of the Association of Jewish Communities in the GDR, Rotstein—all of them, who with good reason demand a high degree of watchfulness towards right totalitarianism, are being identified with said political goals by the campaign of the SED propaganda. The chairman of the Jewish regional community of Mecklenburg, Broido, said, during the medal award ceremony in connection with the commemoration of the 1938 pogroms in the auditorium of the Council of State, looking straight at Honecker: "During my long life there has not been a place, an opportunity, or a time in which Jewish citizens at home and abroad have been bestowed such high honors in this manner. And I don't know of any other head of state who would have done so with such warmth, borne by trust, understanding, and respect."

## HUNGARY

### 'Secret' Kun Telegram to Lenin Released by Soviet Archives

250000506 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian  
12 Nov 88 p 5

[Text] Moscow, 9 Nov 88 (from our Moscow correspondent)—At a press conference held yesterday morning, prominent Soviet archivists told domestic and foreign reporters that over a million documents were being released from heretofore secret archives, in the spirit of openness and of rectifying history. To illustrate how valuable the documents now being made available to researchers were, and what new light they would shed on history, Feliks Kovalev (chief of the Archives Administration at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) read, and then gave the attending Hungarian correspondents copies of,

the telegram that Bela Kun, the Hungarian Soviet Republic's commissar for foreign affairs, sent to Lenin personally on 29 April 1919, as the Hungarian Soviet Republic was struggling for its life under the onslaught of the interventionists. Together with very many other documents pertaining to Hungary's history, this telegram was classified up to now. It reads as follows:

"Dear Comrade Lenin,

"Before we take to the field for our last stand, I must send You my final report. Everything we have done under the dictatorship up to now has been more radical and better-organized work than what You advised the Viennese and the Bavarians to do. We have done all this work without any help, and in spite of betrayal by the proletariat of the neighboring countries. Performing our duty to our last breath, we are forced to realize that what we find so painful is not so much the behavior of the proletariat still suffering under capitalism's exploitation, but the fact of our being forsaken by the already liberated proletariat.

"We are disgusted by Rakovskiy's and Chicherin's behavior. We begged them to start military operations against Bessarabia and Bukovina, so as to arrest the Entente's concentrated attack. What we got instead were mendacious telegrams from Chicherin about the Stanislavskiy government's downfall, while Rakovskiy delayed the attack against Bessarabia and Bukovina. This has enabled the Romanians to deploy all their troops against us.

"We had an understanding with the Galicians, one that would not have upset the changeover to socialism. Instead, Rakovskiy is continuing his own policy which merely seems to be Bolshevik policy. All returning prisoners of war are unanimous in their assessment that this is not internationalist behavior. History will eventually judge what I am establishing already now: that what we have done here is pure Marxist policy, and that the reason why we are unable to continue it is inadequate internationalism, a menshevik policy that only pays lip service to bolshevism. I request that You inform Comrades Zinovyev and Bukharin about this without delay. My telegrams to You are being answered by Chicherin who is telling me stories about nonexistent Galician soviets.

"Devotedly yours to the very end,  
Bela Kun,  
Commissar for Foreign Affairs"

We have been informed that this document will be offered to Hungary's Party History Institute. Naturally, it is a task for historians to decide to what extent the Red Army, then engaged in fierce battles, would have been able to knock out the Romanian army threatening Hungary. And it is unclear what the understanding with the Galicians was. Furthermore, there are gaps also in the history of the western Ukraine, respectively of eastern



Poland. But it is already obvious that this document of unique value fills a gap in the literature on the situation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

## POLAND

**POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup**  
26000224b Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish  
No 49, 3 Dec 88 p 2

[Excerpts]

### National News

An important government decision: The Council of Ministers has adopted proposals for two legal acts defining the future operation of the economy—the law “on undertaking economic activity” and the law “on economic activity with the participation of foreign subjects.” The first calls for, among other things, all sectors to have equal access to credits, production resources, to pay taxes according to common principles, to employ workers without the current limitation on the private sector (in principle it has not been possible to employ more than 50 persons on a shift). The Council of Ministers also adopted a proposed law on the formation of a Central Planning Office. [passage omitted]

Brain tissue was transplanted for the first time in Poland. Healthy tissue from a human miscarriage was implanted in a man suffering from Parkinson's disease. Prof Jerzy Dymek selected the cells, and Dr Miroslaw Dabek performed the operation under the direction of Doc Witold Mazurowski of the capital city hospital in Brodno.

The dairymen have ended their protest action; the union members ended it when the minister of finance decided the size of the subsidy for dairy products and awarded resources for raising wages.

Rumors: one that said the increase in radiation caused by the supposed accident at a nuclear reactor in one of the countries neighboring Poland was officially denied (no apparatus showed an increase in radiation, and there also was no accident), the second begun by the Western Polish-language broadcasting services, which reported that two militiamen who had been sentenced in the court of original jurisdiction to imprisonment for disturbing the public order during a service at St. Brygida Church in Gdansk had been released from their sentences. The government press spokesman explained that the militiamen had been released on a motion by the defense because they are waiting on the appeal in the court of appeals and the preventive measure in the form of temporary arrest is no longer needed. Emotions were aroused by the report on the television program “Panorama of the Day” that fees for a wedding at the Bureau of Vital Statistics were to increase to 30,000 zloty. The

bureaus in the capital city denied the report; fees of 500 zloty are collected—raising them to 3,000 to 6,000 zloty is, however, being considered.

As this issue went to press, the television dialogue of Alfred Miodowicz with Lech Walesa, at the invitation of the head of the OPZZ, appears far away still. Walesa at first demanded that Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik, and Janusz Onyszkiewicz conduct talks on the technical issues; then he proposed that the discussion be held in the Gdansk Lenin Shipyards in front of the public. In turn, Andrzej Wajda advised Walesa that for security it is “absolutely essential” to demand, among other things, that the crew that filmed the “Man of Iron” accompany Walesa and that it film the entire course of the conversation independently of Polish Television.

The Center for Contemporary Art has begun its operations in the Warsaw Ujazdowski Palace.

On public opinion, the Public Opinion Research Center inquired whether the state should help citizens threatened with poverty: 47.1 percent of the respondents answered yes, but only some social groups; 41 percent answered yes for all needing it. But the state should not help those who do not want to work (46.4 percent of the responses); those who are well off (25.6 percent); or those abusing alcohol (24.4 percent). [passage omitted]

The bribery affair in Warsaw concerns trade in vodka and convertible currency. Among the suspects are six militia officers and one district patrolman of the Citizens' Militia (all have been arrested).

Recent reports on the black-market rate for dollar coupons according to VETO. On 19 November for \$1 the rate was 2,600 zloty; on 7 October it was still 2,150 zloty. The market prices for gold have also risen for 1 gram of number “2” quality from 22,000 to 27,000 zloty; “3” quality has risen respectively from 18,500 to 22,000 zloty. The official bank rate for the dollar has jumped above 500 zloty. [passage omitted]

RZECZPOSPOLITA (24 November 1988) printed a polemic between Dr Albina Noskova, a Soviet historian, and Ryszard Wojna, a journalist, and the latter's reply. The object of the dispute is the evaluation of the pre-September policies of Poland and the USSR and the attitudes of Poles toward the Hitlerite occupiers.

The government recently decided it will be possible to export up to \$500 without obtaining permission.

Who's Who News: Jerzy Jedykiewicz (age 42), water structures engineer, chairman of the Gdynia City People's Council, has been named to the position of Gdansk voivod. His predecessor Gen Mieczyslaw Cygan is returning to the office of the minister of national defense. [passage omitted]



### On the Left

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has issued a decree on the incompatibility of the resolution of the Estonian SSR "On the Introduction of Corrections and Additions to the Constitution (fundamental law) of the Estonian SSR" and the declaration of the Estonian SSR on the sovereignty of the Estonian SSR adopted on 16 November 1988 with the USSR Constitution and the binding laws of the USSR.

The Wilno correspondent of PRAVDA, D. Szniukas, considers a similar subject. The special differences of opinion and disputes, in his opinion, concern questions of giving the Lithuanian language status as an official language. Although many Russians and Poles living in Lithuania, especially young people, know Lithuanian and use it, it has aroused opposition. Mutual charges of nationalism and chauvinism have been made. An informal union "Unity" has been formed as a counterweight to "Sajudis." Although both movements support the same goals, invite people of all nationalities, it is no secret that one seldom encounters Russian speakers in "Sajudis" or Lithuanians in "Unity."

There can be no question of secession," Dajnis Ivans, chairman of the Latvian National Front, told the correspondent for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. "For us, sovereignty is a clear expression of those functions that are assigned to the jurisdiction of the republic. Sovereignty in our understanding is also the ability to maintain direct contacts abroad—especially economic relations. We think that as part of the federation only the military and diplomatic apparatus should be joint, while the remaining spheres should be the object of natural mutual economic, political, and cultural relations."

Lenin and the name of Lenin: Under this title the Lithuanian weekly GIMTASIS KRASTAS printed observations by Algimantas Czekuolis. "I am walking in the Wilno district Lenin," he writes. "I pass the adjoining Lenin Square where the Lenin monument stands. I bite an apple raised on the state farm 'Lenin's Way' by comrade Szyszkewiczius, twice decorated with the Order of Lenin. I paid for the apple with a bank note with a picture of Lenin. I received change with his profile. In some military units, the soldiers going on summer maneuvers carry with themselves a 'portable Lenin field room.'"

Stalin inflated this cult. First, he knew no other way; second, it was precisely he who was interested in the likeness remaining and the contents passing out of memory; third, he prepared the soil for his own cult.

"Who was Stalin for us?" Prof Bruzek wonders in RUDE PRAVO. "A symbol of the struggle with fascism and the heroic battles of the Soviet people to liberate Czechoslovakia. This attitude toward Stalin also became the tragedy of all communists who experienced difficult moments during this period, who suffered the results of

the crimes committed in the name of an ideal, with which they associated their hopes and future. But are the ideals or the people who trampled them to blame?" asks the professor.

"The customs office at the train station in Petrovice, at the border with Poland, looks like a department store. There are sacks of oranges, sweets, coconut, nuts, champagne, and pates everywhere. Clumps of bananas, chocolates, canned meat, baby food. All this was collected during the course of one day." RUDE PRAVO justifies the propriety of the customs restrictions taken by Czechoslovakia with this description. It quotes the opinion of customs agents who believe that these huge quantities of goods taken from the CSSR by Poles complicate customs clearance and cause the delay of trains. The second cause is the disregard for the obligation to purchase a specific seat. On the express "Silesia," which has 1,050 seats, there were 2,237 passengers. [passage omitted]

Karoly Grosz, at the last plenum of the MSZMP Central Committee: "A decision was made at the party conference that we still support a single-party system. This position should be maintained until the next congress. I do not think that we will operate in the future under a single-party system; however, the congress should examine and settle this issue. I will present the position that we should move in the direction of a multi-party system. I do not think obviously that it will solve all our problems."

Miklos Nemeth, age 41, is the new Hungarian premier.

The spokesman of the USSR embassy in Berlin called the halting of the distribution of the Soviet monthly SPUTNIK a "decision of the appropriate organs of the GDR, a sovereign state." The editor in chief, Vladimir Dobkin, announced that so far 180,000 copies of the monthly have been sent to the GDR, of which 110,000 were for subscribers. The DPA reports that together with the halting of the distribution of SPUTNIK, the Soviet feature films "Topic," "The Future Was War," "The Cool Summer of 53," and "Commissar" were also withdrawn.

### Opinions

*Dariusz Fikus, journalist:*

"The opposition claims that there are political reasons at the basis of the decision by Premier M.F. Rakowski to liquidate the Lenin Shipyards, that it is an attempt to destroy the birthplace of Solidarity and its still living fortress, that it is a personal attack on Walesa. It is impossible to exclude such motives, but there is no doubt that the shipyard was among those plants for which the decision was issued for economic reasons. . . . Discussion can only concern the priority, but not the sense of the operation. If we are to stand for the reform and demand its systematic implementation, then we must count on the need to make not only unpopular



decisions, but also decisions threatening the interests of particular occupational groups. Premier Rakowski has shown himself to be a determined, courageous politician, who does not fear even to strike important symbols. He bid high and has placed the opposition and the Solidarity activists in a difficult situation."

(GAZETA BANKOWA 14-20 November 1988)

*Prof Dr Artur Bodnar, political scientist:*

[Answer] I think it is time to quit treating the "solidarity" block as a single, solid unit. Two orientations that essentially have little to do with one another are appearing in this block with ever greater clarity. The first of them is the worker-union orientation; the second is narrowly political and holds what I would call an anti-authority philosophy. It consists of a collection of various anarchic orientations. Ever larger groups of people who have decided to seek their identity in the nationalistic-Catholic current, for whom the nation and the state are leading values understood in terms of the social teachings of the church developed in the encyclical of John Paul II, have left the "solidarity" block. As you can see then, a clear process of crystallizing ideological identities is occurring in the various currents in our society. These currents until recently were difficult to distinguish with sufficient clarity. This process can contribute to a more effective overall result at the roundtable and all the more so to the implementation of the conception of a Council of National Reconciliation."

(Interviewed by Krzysztof Motlak, GLOS SZCZECINSKI, 14 November 1988)

*Janusz Patorski, deputy premier:*

[Answer] We are dealing with a world of interests, which until now have not been revealed. In our philosophy, we see a place for management through conflict. The question is obviously the range and openness of the given conflict, but hiding certain contradictions cannot be allowed. Not seeing these types of problems, pretending that they can solve themselves, has usually lead nowhere.

[Question] Who then in the case of conflict plays the role of arbiter?

[Answer] Obviously, that is the place for the politicians, for people from the system of authority, who by argumentation, their personality, in the end reach concrete decisions. Governing is making decisions. It would be bad if we adopted a conception of government favoring everyone at all costs.

(Interviewed by F. Dowiasz, GLOS SZCZECINSKI, 15 November 1988)

[Passage omitted] The opinions and views cited in this section do not always agree with those of the editors.

## PZPR Voivodship Plenums Reported

### Reform, Party Role Differences

26000243 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
17 Nov 88 p 9

[Article by Dr Zbigniew Olesinski, director, Intervoivodship Party School in Warsaw: "Clarity of Basic Issues: Discussion Prior to the Plenum of the Warsaw PZPR"]

[Text] According to the guidelines of the PZPR Central Committee and the gist of the declarations by the First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski, new steps to enhance the party's authority have to be taken.

This is reflected in the approval by the PZPR Voivodship Secretariat of the "Main Directions of Energizing Party Work at the Warsaw Party Organization." In accordance with that document, preparations for the PZPR Voivodship Committee Plenum on "Ideological Aspects of Party Work—Assessments and Importance" were commenced.

The Executive Board of the Warsaw Voivodship PZPR Committee has appointed a taskforce consisting of theoreticians and practitioners. The taskforce drafted 14 theses for discussion. The preparations for the plenum included community conferences, individual talks with selected groups of aktiv, scholarly seminars, and plenary sessions of many basic-level party echelons. Altogether, several thousand party members offered comments and suggestions.

The discussion was dominated by problems of everyday life: the discontent with the growing inflation, the decline in living standards, inefficiency in applying economic reforms. The conversations pointed to passivity, apathy, and pessimistic moods.

The discussion also revealed marked differences in views.

Some party members view with restraint the changes taking place. Others believe that the reforms are indispensable but feel disenchanted with their sluggish pace and frequent halts. The latter group champions a change in the nature of the party's leading role, supports a far-reaching democratization of social life, and is in favor of abandoning controls on market supply and capital. It supports the formation of commodity and capital markets and is resolutely in favor of abandoning the bureaucratic model of economic management.

This group consists chiefly of the younger comrades with higher educational background, including part of the technical intelligentsia, journalists, scientists, physicians, and educators.



A commonly voiced need is that of developing an ideological vision of Polish socialism, of its expedient model, and of the strategy and tactics of achieving it. It is thought that discussion of a program for socialism adapted to conditions in Poland might revive the party ideologically and politically.

Party members are aware of [the party's] support of the expansion of varied forms of the presentation of public interest [that is, of pluralism]. But many feel that the related proposals, such as the idea of the "proreform pact" or the "roundtable" [talks between the opposition and the regime] or extending the hand of friendship to the "constructive opposition," are insufficiently workable. Hence the feeling that the political system is relatively ineffective and the continuing frustration felt by the society.

The assumptions and social consequences of the economic reform continue to dominate the attention of the party aktiv. Most often, discrete solutions of the reform are questioned. In many places it is argued that the reform is "not tangible" at the workplace. Often also attention is drawn to the absence of structural changes in our economy.

The discussion of the directions of changes within the party is broadening in scope. A basic assumption is that the forms and methods of party work have to be adapted to the present conditions.

The discussion of the 14 theses markedly exceeded the bounds of these topics. A dozen or so assessments in writing were submitted to the taskforce for preparing the plenum. These assessments were both by individuals and by basic party organizations, with some representing postdiscussion recommendations. They also included, as in the case of the Downtown Warsaw party organization, records of individual conversations on ideological topics.

I believe that all this rich material will be utilized during the plenum's deliberations and subsequently in the party's ideological work.

In preparing the plenum we also availed ourselves of the findings of polls conducted by an aktiv group of the Warsaw PZPR Committee.

A summary of these findings shows that the public discontent is traceable to the disparity between the level of the society's aspirations and the possibilities for meeting them. Much more complicated is the answer to the question of how to reduce this disparity. Undoubtedly, one of the factors that might contribute to reducing it is economic and political reforms. One should be aware, however, that while overall the application of the reform will improve the living conditions of the society as a whole, at particular periods and within particular social groups this will be accompanied by social tensions.

Several specific issues identified during the polls and relating to party members are worth describing below:

—Above all, there is the highly critical attitude of the party members belonging to the technical intelligentsia. The higher the educational background of the party members polled, the more critical their stance toward many matters.

—Noteworthy is a sizable group of party members who in general avoid committing themselves to party work, side by side with a passive group of party members who do whatever they are bid without displaying any personal initiative themselves.

—In the work of basic party organizations little attention is paid to ideological, intraparty, organizational, and propaganda problems. Party meetings often turn into production conferences.

—Problems of basic significance to the party, which should be constantly analyzed, include the world outlook of party members. Some party members declared themselves to be believers.

—Despite the declarations of many of the respondents that quite a few of their acquaintances and associates are considering the possibility of joining the PZPR, the actual situation is different; hence the number of new members is insufficient.

The party is in a stage of deep ideological confusion. This confusion is largely due to the deep changes wreaking havoc on the traditional principles and methods of action. But it also has subjective origins.

It ensues from lack of clarity in defining the fronts of the ideological struggle and the strategic tasks. While we love democracy and freedom of thought and speech, we should not transform party ideology into an amalgam of fantasies, illusions, contradictory myths, and utopian projects.

Within the party, despite the crisis, we must regain ideological cohesiveness and clarity about fundamental issues.

First, we must reject the ideas, propagated by some of our fellow comrades, that the party should be broken up, dissolved, weakened, or deprived of its apparatus, and that alliances against the allegedly dogmatic party should be explored.

Second, we must reject dogmatic tendencies opposed to the reforms and reflecting nostalgia for what is irretrievably gone. Such dogmatic criticism is as strong within our party as the rightist criticism aimed at dissolving the party. Both these tendencies harm the party, hobble its growth, and retard constructive reforms of ideological principles and style and organization of work.



We rightly repeat that reforms in this country cannot be implemented by the bureaucratic forces, that only the political structures, that is, our party and its allies, can push the reforms through.

Our party's rebirth is therefore a prerequisite for the success of the reforms. And while rejecting dogmatic ossification, we must answer the question of what is lasting and of merit in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. While rejecting Stalinism, we must answer the question of what is lasting in our vision of socialism and what assures the impossibility of a return to Stalinist practices. We must criticize from the Marxist viewpoint many naive myths, stereotypes, and glaring oversimplifications.

### **'Stammering' Reports Criticized**

26000243 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
29 Nov 88 p 2

[Article by Jerzy Nogiec: "The Party Should Not Spread Itself Thin: Plenum of the Gorzow Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Text] During a pause in the plenary session of the Gorzow Voivodship PZPR Committee, several secretaries of basic party organizations mentioned the number of monthly meetings which they have to attend. They are invited by the League of Polish Women or by the scouts, they have to attend the session of the people's council, and likewise they cannot afford to absent themselves from elections to occupational organizations. In the end, they have little time left for organizational work within the party, for the exercise of politics.

They say that the old style of party work still persists. Yet, recently something has changed in the attitude toward the policy of the party and the government. The new policy and proactivism of the government of Prime Minister Rakowski have demolished the barriers of mistrust, and plant workforces opened themselves, so to speak, and the conditions for sincere talks now exist. This should be exploited upon determining the strategy and tactics of action.

The comrades also adopted a skeptical stance toward the report presented by the Executive Board of the Voivodship Committee. Once again, they say, a picture of the voivodship's economic situation is presented, and once again the need to strengthen and energize that situation is mentioned, but there are no suggestions as to how to accomplish this, the political aspects are not mentioned, and tasks are not specified.

Once again, likewise, during the discussion some comrades mechanically recited statistics from 3-by-5 cards on how many dwellings were built by state farms for their employees, and how many liquid waste treatment plants. They quoted dry-as-dust figures without any political analysis.

Against this background, two speeches stood out. The first, by Kazimierz Borowski of Barlinek, criticized the bureaucratization of the party apparatus, analyzed thoroughly the mistakes in the work with youth, and condemned routine, dull, and formalized work.

Once again the opinions voiced offstage are that if the report of the Executive Board was as well written, it would elicit interesting discussion.

The other intriguing speech was by Wlodzimierz Kiernozyski of Gorzow who discussed the anonymity of party members at their domiciles, the need for them to support and promote self-government activism so as to awaken the interest of tenants and prompt them to participate in community affairs within their housing projects. He also discussed the possibilities for utilizing the activism of persons involved in the referendum and elections—public activists who are forgotten once the referendum or the elections are over.

In connection with the return of the Economic Secretary of the Voivodship PZPR Committee Piotr Mackiewicz to work in a bank, the plenum appointed to his post the heretofore First Secretary of the Slubice City-Township PZPR Committee Zbigniew Falinski.

The deliberations were chaired by First Secretary of the Gorzow Voivodship PZPR Committee Wiktor Kinecki.

### **Praise for Sieradz Cooperation**

26000243 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
1 Dec 88 p 2

[Article by Jerzy Rybczynski: "Spurring Party Work in the Countryside: Plenum of the Sieradz Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Text] Practically every farmer in Sieradz Voivodship belongs to an agricultural circle, a rural housewives' circle, or a rural cooperative. If we also consider membership in volunteer fire brigades and youth and sports organizations, it can be seen that the Sieradz countryside is highly organized. In addition, about 46 percent of the members of the voivodship party organization are rural dwellers. All this was said on 30 November at the plenum of the Sieradz Voivodship PZPR Committee, on cautioning that one should not be intoxicated by statistical successes. For the actual social activism of rural dwellers, including members of rural basic party organizations, is not what should be expected; particularly disturbing is the apathy of young rural dwellers, among whom the "wait and see" attitude is still popular. Even the most activist individuals, those who initiate volunteer community projects to build roads, water pipelines, and schools, feel discouraged by the lack of broad social support for their efforts. Political work in the countryside is not helped by the shortages of producer goods and loans for young farmers, it was stressed at the plenum. And conversely, every specific economic or political step wins more members or adherents for the party. This was



also mentioned by Jan Leszczynski of Grzyb Village, Klonowa Rural Township, where party initiative combined with volunteer community work bore fruit in the form of the construction of a community center and a firehouse. Henryk Kucharski of Działoszyn Township stated that instead of big speeches and reports there is a need for frequent, direct, and even informal contacts between the leading party aktiv and the rural dwellers, especially youth. In his township such meetings enjoy great popularity and the otherwise rarely used firehouses serve as sites for clubs, lounges, and village stores, thus making for easier living conditions of the local dwellers and providing the conditions for social activism.

The plenum adopted a resolution placing the voivodship PZPR committee under the obligation of forming jointly with the ZSL [United Peasant Party] and youth organizations a broad-based alliance for rural proactivism and support of the changes and reforms taking place in the countryside.

#### **Rural Stress on Rules**

26000243 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
6 Dec 88 p 2

[Article by Mieczyslaw Kaca: "The New Rural Basic Party Organizations: Plenum of the Radom Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Text] Farming in Radom Voivodship is hardly outstanding. With its numerous small farms, underinvestment, and shortages of producer goods, it encounters many difficulties. Rapid changes to the better are indispensable. These changes should also be promoted by all the party organizations active in the countryside.

The discussion at last Monday's plenum of the Radom Voivodship PZPR Committee (on 5 December) centered on adapting the role of PZPR elements to the needs of the changing agriculture. The need to cooperate with ZSL circles and other social organizations active in the countryside was mentioned. The principal topic, however, was eliminating the barriers to the growth of crop and livestock output and the processing industry.

First Secretary of the Radom Voivodship PZPR Committee Bogdan Prus appealed for bold and critical discussion and offered the reminder that as of 1 January many current regulations will cease to apply. Already at the preceding voivodship committee plenum Comrade Sobon of Zakrzew Rural Township had pointed to the absurdity of certain regulations governing the contracting and procurements of hogs. These regulations will finally cease to apply.

"Rural dwellers are not evaluating us according to the color of our identity card [party card]," argued Jan Bancerowski of Ciepielow, a delegate to the 10th PZPR Congress. "Instead they judge us in our capacity as farmers, parents, citizens. Evaluations of party activism are much too formalized. The five members of our local

basic party organization sell to the state as much food as all the remaining village population. But even so 'the Top' views us with a jaundiced eye because we do not hold regular monthly meetings and are slow in providing it with copies of the minutes of those meetings. But we don't like paperwork and elaborate reports. I would thus be very pleased if the resolution to be adopted by this plenum would not exceed three pages in writing; thereby it would be more concrete and clear."

The Secretary of the Przylek Gmina [Rural Township] PZPR Committee Ryszard Maraszkiewicz also demanded that party work in the countryside be relieved of bureaucratic encrustation. He claimed that the criterion for evaluating the activism of basic party organizations should be not the number of meetings held but the party's authority within the local community due to initiatives and competence in handling problems raised by local dwellers.

#### **Energy, Municipal Property Viewed**

26000243 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
9 Dec 88 p 2

[Article by Henryk Prawda: "Streamlining the Municipal Services Is a Social Requirement: Plenum of the Szczecin Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Text] A new look has to be taken at the problems of municipal services from the standpoint of far-reaching conservation measures rather than from the standpoint of pumping more fuel and energy into these services. Municipal services in Poland are twice or thrice as energy-intensive as in the developed countries.

Szczecin Voivodship exemplifies the considerable potential for streamlining heat consumption. It contains extensive deposits of peat which still is not utilized in heating. Near Szczecin there is the Lower Odra Electrical Power Plant which could provide heat for the local community. A team from the Polytechnic established that the complete automation of heating systems alone could conserve 15 to 20 percent of the energy consumption. In the meantime, however, heat in the dwellings is being regulated not by automatic devices but by windows, said Roman Sobanski, a professor at the Szczecin Polytechnic.

Ryszard Tamm, a trade unionist from the Voivodship Municipal Transportation Enterprise (WKPM), said, "The economic-financial system at the WKPM and other municipal-service enterprises is upside down and hobbles their growth. This system has been automatically copied from industry by the municipal services without making any allowance for the specific nature of these services. One paradox follows another. For example, the WKPM receives big subsidies but nevertheless it must pay an income tax to the State Treasury."



Such was the spirit of the businesslike discussion, lasting several hours, on the status of the voivodship's economy and its prospects for growth until the year 2000, during the plenum of the Szczecin Voivodship PZPR Committee (on 8 December). Pointing to the great social importance of municipal services, the speakers stressed the related progress achieved in the voivodship as reflected in, among other things, the steady growth of central heating and municipal transportation, the quantities of potable water provided, and the construction of waste treatment plants.

But it was also stated that this progress is far from sufficient and comprehensive. Currently, municipal services as a whole are not meeting the public needs and the continuation of the traditional negative trends and operating procedures will aggravate the disproportions between the expectations of the public and the possibilities for meeting them.

In the adopted resolution the PZPR voivodship committee plenum accorded party support to the program for developing municipal services until the year 2000, presented by Szczecin Voivode Stanislaw Malec. The voivodship committee placed the caucus of PZPR members of the voivodship people's council under the obligation of taking steps to assure the acceptance of this program by the Szczecin Voivodship People's Council by the end of 1989.

In their turn, party echelons and organizations should stimulate the drafting of local programs for the expansion of municipal services. The party members employed in local administrative agencies are duty-bound to take an active part in such drafting and subsequently in an efficient introduction of [the new property right of] municipal ownership and in demonopolizing municipal services.

As for the organizational part of the plenum of the Szczecin Voivodship PZPR Committee, under the chairmanship of First Secretary Stanislaw Miskiewicz it replaced the committee's secretary for organizational affairs. It thanked the previous secretary Stefan Rogalski for his many years of political-organizational work and conveyed to him best wishes in his new post as chairman of the Voivodship People's Council. The new secretary for organizational affairs is Wladyslaw Kaczanowski, previously director of the political-organizational department under the voivodship PZPR committee.

#### **Party Effort 'Paralysis' Noted**

26000243 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
15 Dec 88 p 2

[Article by Henryk Heller: "Up-to-Dateness of Thought and Action: Plenum of the Poznan Voivodship PZPR Committee"]

[Text] The subject of the plenary deliberations of the Poznan Voivodship PZPR Committee on 14 December

was ideological and propaganda activity as related to reforming the economy and renewing societal life.

The plenum was prepared in accordance with novel principles. Allowing for the discrepancies in the evaluations of ways and means of implementing socialist reforms in the state, as well as for self-reforming within the party, the leadership of the voivodship party echelon appealed to many basic party organizations for providing their comments on this topic. In addition, four seminar taskforces were appointed.

This resulted in a wealth of material which served to prepare the report for the plenum and which will provide, together with the results of the discussion, a basis for drafting recommendations for the Third National Party Conference on Theory and Ideology.

The deliberations, which were chaired by First Secretary of the Voivodship PZPR Committee Edward Lukasik, were attended by, among others, Candidate Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee Gabriela Rembisz and Director of the Ideology Department under the PZPR Central Committee Andrzej Czyz.

"I feel strongly," said Pawel Lagodzinski, casting department foreman at the Poznan Harvesting Machinery Factory, "that in our party Marxism and Leninism was, is, and should be the ideological foundation, for it is the only ideology which reveals reality instead of mystifying it. Always, however, it is man who is the greatest value and the ultimate purpose of the party's activities.

"The greatest reflection and serious rethinking is required by the party's attitude toward the working class, including the disturbing fact that the proportion of workers among the members of the PZPR is too small. Unless the situation in this respect changes, the reform will be menaced by the absence of mass support among precisely the working class, yet that support is indispensable and infallible.

"Democracy in industry and in worker self-government is the way of consolidating that support, enhancing the influence of workers on enterprise affairs." In this connection the speaker proposed accelerating the implementation of all the party initiatives expressed in the documents of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth plenums of the PZPR Central Committee.

This proposal was in accord with the comments of another discussant, the Secretary of the Branch Party Organization at the Institute of Sociopolitical Sciences, Agricultural Academy in Poznan, Dr Zenon Wartel:

"Not everyone knows which resolutions still apply and to what extent. To me, a factor paralyzing the party's efficiency is the absence of complete and genuine—within the framework of democratic centralism—discussion prior to the adoption of important decisions by the party. Under the present-day circumstances, now that



many diverse solutions are being discussed in this country and many forms of authentic definition of political attitudes are evolving, our party organizations remain an island dependent on and awaiting the decisions of the party leadership.

"The [voivodship party committee's] report presented at today's plenum appears to sanction this practice. It states, 'The creation of facts accomplishes the most proper way of translating into reality the line of reform and renewal.' I believe that there exists an urgent need to sanction [free discussion] of political issues within the PZPR structures. Only then will the party be able to optimize its decisions and rapidly abandon unfelicitous draft resolutions."

The Poznan plenum abounded in many deeply considered comments and recommendations voicing genuine concern for the status of the party, for its role at the workplace under the new economic, social, and political circumstances. But some speeches also reflected still incomplete understanding of the fundamental assumptions underlying the party's life. There were attempts to sidetrack attention by stressing that "Everyone wants to derive maximum benefits from a minimum of work input." Such was the idea behind some of the speech by Wacław Plenzier, a voivodship committee lecturer from the Institute of Meteorology and Maritime Economy, who stressed that a worker's chief concern at his workplace is his wages, which matter more to him than being proactive in a public organization or in worker self-government.

And although this time rejoinders were offered, thus enriching the party discussion, no rejoinder was offered to precisely this opinion.

#### **10th PZPR CC Plenum Commentary, Strength, Direction of Party Assessed**

26000248 Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish  
No 53, 31 Dec 88 pp 1, 6

[Article by Marek Henzler: "The Third Attempt"]

[Text] Something is starting to happen at the Party House in Warsaw. For a dozen or so months now, various excavations have been made there, and the once bright-colored sandstone cladding that building is being cleaned of the gray "patina" of filth that had accumulated on it over nearly 40 years. On the once-again bright walls there now appear various slogans breathing life into that usually dull slab of a building. For the last dozen days or so the banner "The Party in Changes. Changes in the Party" has been hanging on the building's wall. But when we reach the driveway in front of the Central Committee Building, we perceive under the "No Parking" sign the plaque, "Except PZPR Central Committee [Vehicles]." These days, now that the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee is under way, both that banner and that plaque have a meaning of their own.

"A thoroughgoing reform of the Polish United Workers Party is a necessity." This is the first and probably the most important of the 187 Politburo theses announced just before the Plenum. "This is a behest of the present and the orientation toward the future," we further read in that special brochure of more than 30 pages whose text should initiate serious discussion among party members about the party and its role in a Poland that is so rapidly changing nowadays. And at the same time, since this party was, is, and wishes to continue, this discussion and its results should also be of interest to its nonparty allies as well as to its opponents. And that interest can be quite readily awakened now that this third version of the theses is written—it should be emphasized—in a language easy to understand by most people, unlike most party documents till now.

Major discussion of the condition of a political party usually takes place during its regular congresses or conferences. This also applies to the PZPR in recent years. This is happening for the third time in the last 7 years. The first time was in 1981, when it was crowned, as it were, by the Ninth Extraordinary Congress during which a break was made with the past, the policy of national reconciliation and reforms was established, and the supremacy of elected party authorities over the salaried party staff was clearly emphasized. At that time, too, specific terms of office were introduced for party leaders, along with the requirement that members of the leadership be recommended by party organizations, and the possibility of appointing the same person to several different posts at the same level (e.g., a deputy prime minister who is at the same time a member of the Politburo) was curtailed.

Then 2 and ½ years ago we again had discussion prior to the 10th Congress, which also made many new decisions, though these were not as essential as the decisions adopted by the Ninth Extraordinary Congress. Soon afterward it began to be thought that not all of these decisions had strengthened the party, and moreover that they were not always consistently and smoothly implemented by the party leadership elected at the 10th Congress.

The party was plunged in a distinctive "stagnation period" of our own [by analogy with the Brezhnev-era period in the USSR, as meant by Henzler] and a flowering of party bureaucracy took place. Several major drives with doubtful results were initiated (such as the struggle for the moral renewal of the nation, job certification and review of organizational structures in the state, and last the [price-increase] referendum and the so-called second stage of the reform). In the meantime, time was being lost. The economic crisis worsened, the market was collapsing, foreign indebtedness and inflation continued to rise, and public discontent grew, since the society has not been satisfied with the excessively slow pace of the political changes admittedly taking place.

During the year now ending major strike waves occurred twice, and were followed by the collapse of the cabinet of



Prime Minister Zb. Messner, a collapse unprecedented in the history of the Polish People's Republic. There now arose favorable soil for a revival of the political opposition, whose so-called constructive wing has even been enabled, in a sense, to act without suffering negative consequences.

But this "stagnation period" within the party has ended within it, as it were. Such an assumption is warranted by the recently announced theses and the discussion taking place during the first part of the 10th Central Committee Plenum.

What is the PZPR nowadays? And what is the size of its membership? This is worth knowing at the outset of that new discussion. Although, compared with mid-1980, the party has lost more than a million members, it still is a mass party. Its membership accounts for 8.2 percent of Poland's adult population—2,148,000 members and candidate members. It must be pointed out here that this refers to the more adult population because only every 45th party member is in the 18-29 age category, and the median age of its members (46.1 years) is nearly 3 years higher than the median age for the adult part of the society.

The PZPR's membership is moreover extremely differentiated in terms of territory, subsector, and socio-occupational categories. In Slupsk Voivodship 10.9 percent of the population belong to the PZPR, whereas in Nowy Sacz Voivodship it is only 5.2 percent. There are enterprises, such as the cotton works in Lomza, where 8.4 percent of the workforce belongs to the party, and there are others, in the same subsector, such as the cotton works in Zdunska Wola where 30.4 percent of the workforce are party members. At the Ostrowiec Swietokrzyski Steelworks party members account for 26 percent of the workforce, at the May Day Mine, 11.5 percent; and at the Sosnowiec Mine, 35.7 percent. Undoubtedly this is a function of the competence and efficacy of the local party organization at each of these plants and factories.

Following the last couple of years, during which party membership had grown even if only insignificantly, in the first 9 months of 1988 the number of new members admitted was 1,500 lower than the number of those leaving the party.

In a party which calls itself a workers' party only 38 percent of the members are workers (lowest proportion ever in the history of the PZPR). Barely every ninth worker belongs to the party, as does barely every 25th farmer. Peasants account for 9 percent of the party's membership, although their number has increased slightly in the last 2 years compared with the number of workers.

The most numerous group within the party is the intelligentsia (51.7 percent of membership); every fourth member of the intelligentsia, varied as its composition may be, is a party member. Every second employee of the state administration or of the administration of

justice is a party member, and so is barely every 17th employee of the health service. Most intellectuals within the party are persons holding executive positions. In addition, only 1.5 percent of university students belong to the party, and none does in every fourth university. Even now the party is facing the peril of a stoppage in the influx of young intellectuals into its ranks.

In addition to the negative changes in the composition of PZPR membership itself, other tendencies have appeared recently. A crisis has arisen in the traditional forms of the party's action. What happened is something that could be termed the crisis of the purpose of the party meeting, at which by now party lecturers draw scanty crowds. After 1600 hours most party buildings are empty, and the armchair style of work is returning. This is assisted by the subsector division of party-committee departments, which dates back to Stalinist times and duplicates corresponding cells in the state and economic administration. It was only about a dozen months ago that new forms of voivodship party committee work, consisting chiefly in broader rank-and-file participation, began to be introduced experimentally.

All these abovementioned problems were very self-critically presented in the theses and discussed during the plenum. But diagnosis is one thing and recommendations are another.

This could be read about in the theses but was not as widely reflected in the discussion at the plenum. This produced the impression that Central Committee members have not yet succeeded in assimilating the theses of the Politburo and debating them within their constituencies. Moreover, organizational matters took up too much time during the plenum.

What do then those 187 theses say? Above all, that our systemic solutions are of a pioneering nature for socialist countries and that the perestroika in the USSR favors them as never before.

—The Politburo admitted in its theses the validity of the belief, widespread within the party, that we could have utilized recent years better and more effectively. Consistency and determination were lacking and "personnel decisions were faulty."

—The relics of Stalinism have to be dealt with completely; the political and moral rehabilitation of its victims should be acknowledged.

—The party should be an organizer of the masses and a collective intellectual [as published]. This can be accomplished if the party's function as a political and social movement predominates and also if political methods of guidance of the functions of ruling and governance predominate.



- During and after the merger of the Polish workers' parties (meaning the merger of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) into the PZPR) the legacy of the political thought of the PPS and of the democratic tendency of the PPR became impoverished.
  - The present model of the worker movement under socialism is not definitive but "at present there are no cogent political arguments for an organizational division into two worker parties."
  - A definite majority of people in Poland, and many party members as well, are believers. This is an objective fact which shall remain "a lasting element of Polish national life in the foreseeable future." Socialism as a social order does not by nature conflict with religion and religiosity, and unless there is mass participation by believers, "the renewal of socialism in Poland, the formation of its new shape, is not and shall not be conceivable."
  - Socialism is not an end in itself. It is a stage in the development of human civilization toward freedom through participatory democracy and humanization of the life of the individual.
  - Changes in the political system nowadays proceed in the direction of a socialist parliamentary democracy. Its principal element will be a strong parliament—the supreme political representation of the nation, rather than a representation of discrete social strata and groups, occupations, and regions. There has to be an explicit division into legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The party shall strive "toward total relinquishment of cumbersome and inefficient supplanting or duplication of [the functions of] government bodies."
  - The party shall not relinquish its influence on personnel policy.
  - We are ready to develop a dialogue with the opposition and to explore together with it forms of cooperation if it respects constitutional order.
  - The party is in favor of developing a mixed-sector [state, private, and cooperative] economy, provided that public ownership retains its dominant role.
  - Nothing is prejudged once and for all. We favor broadening the discussion of the optimal model of the trade-union movement and "the corresponding proper forms of pluralism."
  - The party should continue to be a mass party.
  - The principle that every party member who is a candidate for elections, including even candidates for party leadership, present his own program of action prior to the election, should be accepted and propagated.
  - Elements of the party apparatus should be turned into working secretariats of social bodies. The party leadership sanctions intraparty experiments with various organizational solutions, inclusive of a return to horizontal ties between party organizations.
  - "In the political and socioeconomic system of the People's Republic of Poland nothing nowadays is inviolable and final so far as its reforming and modernization are concerned, with the exception of the fundamental, social purposes of socialism and of the Polish *raison d'état*," says the last of the principal theses.
- During the deliberations, of the nearly 30 speakers few referred directly to these theses, but certain motifs appeared already during the initial stage of the discussions. Only one speaker favored a second trade union [Solidarity] in the average factory. Nearly all the subsequent speakers disputed this idea and demanded that only one trade union be left to each factory.
- The party apparatus, especially at the middle level, proved to be the whipping boy. Many critical comments were also addressed to the party leadership and to the method for presenting new candidates to that leadership. During the open part of the discussion, however, no speaker defended any of the resigning members of the leadership, while secret balloting for new nominations revealed marked differences in the assessments of discrete candidates. Particularly controversial were the nominations of S. Ciosek—it was being whispered offstage that his talks with the opposition hurt him—and Z. Czarzasty. The latter was probably hardly helped by the negative propaganda treatment of the most recent visit of the Central Committee Secretariat to Slupsk Voivodship—the energetic new organizational secretary of the Central Committee seems to be perceived as a threat by a part of the party apparatus.
- During the 10th Central Committee Plenum greater changes in the party leadership were carried out than during the last 10th party congress (see the "National News" column). The yeast added to the new dough may not always have been young, but it was new.
- During the second part of the Plenum we shall ascertain from the text of its resolution just how that dough will be rising. Especially considering that Central Committee members were given more food for thought by the speech of Prime Minister M. F. Rakowski who presented several questions and assessments of fundamental importance to Poland—concerning not just the economic but also and above all the political situation.



The striving toward the roundtable [talks between the regime and the opposition] is a sign not of weakness but of the party's broad program for reforms, stated the prime minister. Jointly with the OPZZ [National Trade Union Alliance] and moderate leaders of the former Solidarity it is possible to discuss the future model of the trade-union movement, different from its present-day counterpart. Let us not fear the pluralism inscribed in the 1982 Trade-Union Decree. Following the TV interview and in his subsequent comments, Lech Walesa appeared as a supporter of national reconciliation, of gradual reforms, and as a man who understands the need for a compromise.

The prime minister further stated that the generally conciliatory attitude of L. Walesa and of most of the activists rallied round him can be relied upon. In such a new situation, M. F. Rakowski wondered openly whether Central Committee members should not be asking themselves if they are being anachronistic by adhering to the divisions of a few years ago considering that nowadays such divisions are different. To what extent are we open to new solutions? To what extent have our opponents of 1981 [Solidarity] understood and learned something, too? What is to be our further attitude toward the eventual evolution of the model of the trade-union movement? Will attracting the cooperation of people and forces who are disenchanted with socialism and ogling the other side weaken the socialist nature of the reforms and changes? Or on the contrary, will it strengthen socialism considering that some of these people will attend to effectuating genuine reforms under the socialist system of society?

In conclusion, the prime minister stated that answers to these questions can be expected in mid-January. There is no doubt that the further unfolding of the situation in Poland in 1989 will largely hinge on these answers as they will be given by the Central Committee members.

### **Second Chamber, Presidency: Whose, What Purpose Do They Serve?**

26000228 Warsaw: *POLITYKA* in Polish  
No 48, 26 Nov 88 p 3

[Article by Barbara Zawadzka, an employee at the Institute of State and Law, Polish Academy of Sciences: "Old Models: The President or the Council of State?"]

[Text] Although there has been talk for several years about restoring the institution of the presidency and about transforming the single-chamber Sejm into a parliament with two houses, nobody has come up with any concrete proposals yet concerning the way to create them or the scope of their jurisdiction. They are for the time being only slogans, and therefore a matter-of-fact discussion about the propriety of calling forth these institutions is almost impossible. Lately, what with the preparations for the roundtable, the frequency of using these slogans has noticeably increased.

The reforms under discussion involve issues of considerable import concerning the system regarding the uppermost bodies of state power. Any reforms would therefore require an amendment to our present Constitution, and this does not mean a sporadic, piecemeal amendment but one that will provide a new structuring of our whole system of our uppermost state bodies. The Sejm, probably the new Tenth Session, is the only forum that would be proper to make decisions on these matters. Meanwhile, today the rather nebulous propositions for changes made to date are being treated as though they had already been approved. For example, S. Podemski writes (*POLITYKA* 40) about "the second chamber" as follows: "It is encouraging that, after a long interruption, our country IS TO RETURN"—the emphasis is my own—"to the parliamentary institution it has enjoyed for many centuries."

If such a gathering is assembled, this roundtable, which rumors have linked (not all the information is available) to such proposals, will not be a group to replace constitutional state bodies but a forum for political discussion. Its purpose would be achieved, if the various political forces could agree on proposals about how to resolve the country's major issues. These proposals, especially insofar as they call for amending laws on the books, would have to be sent to the bodies authorized to introduce legislation (the Council of State, a group of at least 15 deputies, or the Council of Ministers) and reviewed by the Sejm.

Certainly, anything agreed upon by a broad political group would have some weight in the Sejm, but it is only the Sejm itself which can endow any roundtable proposals with the stature and force of law.

There are further misunderstandings about the reason for introducing the proposed innovations into our system. In the above-mentioned article, S. Podemski refers to the tradition of a higher chamber of the state assembly, such as the Sejm of the Republic, when there was a noble class. This is not convincing. If we are to go back to this tradition, we should remember that there were three "estates" of the Sejm: the chamber of deputies representing the nobles, the senate composed of clerical and lay magnates, and the king, who was treated as a separate estate of the Sejm. So perhaps we should go back to having a king, in keeping with a still longer tradition? It is enough to pose the question for it to be clear just how selective this appeal to legal tradition is and how weak its proof is.

### **Who Needs a Senate?**

Should we go back to the senate tradition of the Second Republic? It was also an elite body—this elitism was of course adapted to the social structure of the time—especially following the state reforms of 1935. The Senate "corrected" the decisions made by the Sejm—this sometimes was because of the efforts of the Left—on behalf not of abstract legal perfection but the interests of



the predominating social forces, interests which, for example, called for severely dampening the effect of the law on agricultural reform. Is a socially elite body a proper model for us today when we are looking for a way to democratic socialism? Let us remember that in a referendum in 1946 the nation expressed its rejection of just such an elite upper chamber.

Whose interests should the new "senate" represent? What should it "correct" and from what point of view? Should it be a higher chamber, or, contrary to tradition, a lower one, or a parallel chamber of deputies? There are no detailed proposals on this aspect, but the rumors concern the extent to which the "senate" should be structured to represent the political opposition, while the chamber of deputies retained its present political composition. Given the fact that both chambers would have to reach a position upon which they could both agree, such a system would effectively block the possibility of the parliament's reaching any sort of politically significant decision. After all, in practice any sort of two-chamber system is bound to lead to a legislative procedure which involves great delays and complications, along with weakening the parliament's position in relations with the government.

These last circumstances must also be examined from the viewpoint of another version of "the second chamber," one that was formulated at the beginning of the 1980's, in keeping with the Yugoslav tradition of self-government.

In contrast to the chamber of deputies, which is charged with expressing political options and synthesizing local, branch, and group interests into a single all-national interest, under this concept the second chamber would be charged with representing the production interests through representatives of self-governing bodies, trade union organizations and sociovocational bodies. There is another version in which the second chamber represents all the self-governing bodies as a whole, including local ones. Would it be a good thing to create such a chamber within the Polish Sejm?

The Sejm, of course, probably does need to include not only voices expressing the Party's political views but also those of various sorts of interest groups, especially producer groups and regional groups. The question is: Do we have to create a second chamber in order to achieve this end? Sociological research shows that citizens think deputies express both general national interests and local ones. Although members of the Sejm's present session were elected in a manner that is far from democratic, the problems and interests of the production sphere, consumers, retired people, the younger generation, and so on are all reflected. Given more authentic elections, various interest groups would be still far better represented. On the other hand, the "self-government interests" are merely the interests of groups making up a certain self-governing style, which actually means again representing interest groups.

With the help of institutions of the election system, any sort of social interest in keeping with the socialist system can find a way to be represented in a single-chamber Sejm. It is largely a question of two elements of the election system: the broadening of the political and social base of the components of the system, that is, groups and organizations authorized to put up their own candidates, and the authenticity of the process of announcing candidates. Such solutions would make the chamber of deputies more representative. Would it not be wiser to try to produce this result, instead of patching up the inadequate level of representation in the Sejm's single chamber with artificial additions?

In Yugoslavia, birthplace of the "self-governing chamber" models, for 40 years great weight has been attached to expression within producer interest groups. Between 1963 and 1974 the Yugoslav parliament was made up of as many as five chambers, four of which represented various areas of vocational activity, but experience showed this system to be so undesirable that in a short time it was replaced with another one. It is therefore difficult to agree with people who have no doubt whatever about a second chamber for our Sejm.

#### A Collegial Head of State Is Enough

The project to restore the institution of the presidency in Poland also creates some doubt. At present, a collegial body, the Council of State, handles the function of "head of state." S. Podemski's statement that it was introduced in the 1952 Constitution "as a result of adopting foreign Stalinist models" is false. First, the Council of State came into being not in 1952 but in January 1947—it had been introduced in what we call the "Small Constitution," which was ratified by the Legislative Sejm—which was before Stalinist models were uncritically reproduced in Poland. Both the Council of State and the President of the Council of State, who was its chairman, were in operation for 5 years before 1952. Second, the USSR did not and does not have a body which closely corresponds to the Council of State. The Presidium of the Supreme Council was not the same, especially not in Stalin's time. Third, there was a genuine need to create the Council of State as the body which, for example, monitored the operations of the people's councils, and this need has currently become greatly expanded into the need to oversee and care for all sorts of self-government groups. Neither the Sejm, which is busy with legislation, nor a single person in the form of a President could fill this role, and it is more fitting for a body issuing from the Sejm to oversee the self-governing bodies than for the government to.

It is also hard to agree with the unequivocal assessment that the Council of State is a Stalinist institution. In its 40-year history, of course there have been periods when it replaced the Sejm, in keeping with the Stalinist spirit. Today too one can criticize various realms of its operations, but it also has made a considerable contribution, especially since 1980, for example, in the area of helping the people's councils and self-government bodies.



We cannot discuss the introduction of the office of president without describing the scope of the office's jurisdiction. Several "models" of the office of president have come into being throughout the world: a president operating within the framework of a parliament-cabinet system, in which the president only carries out the classical functions of a head of state while the parliament is the highest body; a presidential system in which the president creates a government and heads it, one in which the president is the chief executive body; and a system in which the president also has strong authority over the parliament, being able to dissolve it, for example. This last system comes the closest to Montesquieu's division of powers and the notion of their "restraining and balancing" one another. Finally, people are also talking about the possibility of creating a presidency wherein the person would preside over the Council of State and have a jurisdiction similar to that which currently resides in its chairman. In this last instance, nothing would change, not even the name (the Polish word would be replaced by a French one with a meaning that is etymologically identical).

Adoption of the parliament-cabinet model would mean having an individual take over the functions of head of state that are presently carried out by a collegial body. It is not clear what would happen to the other functions of the Council of State, such as the above-mentioned oversight over the people's councils and self-governing bodies. It is nonetheless very important to answer the question of whether it is more democratic to have these important functions handled by a single individual and whether this solution would better suit the requirement of a government by the people (democracy) than having them handled by a collegial body. I see no arguments supporting an affirmative answer to the question.

It would be still harder to find arguments in support of solutions approximating the presidential system, because authority focused in the hands of an individual is great and provides the real possibility of competition with the parliament over influence on the running of state matters and even over a position superior to its own. This model reminds us of that created by the 1935 Constitution, as well as the De Gaulle system, that is, regimes which not without good reason are thought to limit democracy.

Government by the people is one of the basic values of socialism and is accomplished by making representative bodies superior to executive bodies. It is true that there have been times, very long ago, when a monarch, even an absolute one, was considered the representative of the nation. One might think that a president who had come to power by winning a general election could provide representation in the form of a single person. Nonetheless, we cannot consider the role of president to be a "single-person representative" comparable to the parliament's representation role, because the parliament has roles such as expressing the interests of various social groups, the control of executive power—a president

coming to power through a general election would not be subject to control by the Sejm—and the regime's principle of electors' control over their representatives. Although popular opinion has it that this latter control is a myth, this is by no means true, particularly at the level of the Sejm.

To set up a president with powers superior to those of the Sejm would therefore be a departure from one of the basic values of socialism, government by the people. In addition, this system harbors the danger usually connected with focusing great power in the hands of an individual, particularly if it turns out that the election did not yield a good choice...

People say that the most important task of a president would be to act as arbiter, in the event of social conflict, to resolve matters by using the power of his authority. We need to create mechanisms to help resolve conflicts, and they may become even more necessary as pluralism develops. The thing is that the possession of authority, especially the moral authority that can be useful in resolving social conflicts, is a personal characteristic of the individual and need not necessarily be linked to the office the person holds.

The proposals calling for us to introduce the institution of the presidency and a "second chamber" therefore produce a number of doubts which should be probed very extensively. During the past few years we have already had too many hasty actions in state matters of great importance. We must put an end to this practice. In our country there are issues which can and must be handled rapidly. In such cases procrastination is a grave error. There are also cases, however, in which deliberation is more important than speed. The issues we have been discussing fall into the latter category.

One more thing: The innovations being discussed have come out of a desire to find a plane of political agreement with the opposition around a roundtable. Unless the partners to the talks accept these efforts, should we then be striving to translate them into reality anyway? I tried to explain that they are not moving the democratic model of socialism ahead a single step. There are many other ways to expand the political base of government.

#### **Religion, State: Overcoming Obstacles to Understanding**

26000247 Warsaw PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI in Polish No 50, 11 Dec 88 pp 5, 7

[Article by Andrzej Swieicki: "Religion and the State"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Our country, Catholic for a millennium, lies within the reaches of the historic influence of other currents of Christianity. During the Partition Period Poland was ruled by Orthodox, tsarist Russia, Protestant Prussia, and the Catholic Austro-Hungary of the Hapsburgs. In the 19th Century and until mid-20th Century pathological structural tendencies existed



in all these countries. The Russian Orthodox religion did not preserve Russia from tsarist autocracy and subsequently from Stalinism. Prussian Protestantism did not preserve Germany from Hitlerism, and Catholicism did not preserve Austro-Hungary from Josephinism [enlightened absolutism combined with subordination of the state to the Catholic Church, as practiced by Emperor Joseph II] and subsequently from the disintegration of its state structures.

From the denominational standpoint, contemporary Poland differs from its neighbors by having a relatively uniformly Catholic population. On the other hand, its political authorities took form in accordance with prescriptions of a nonreligious ideology based on dictatorship and a linear, centralized system of leadership. These differences are one reason for the conflicts which have undergone several stages. To this day the existing tensions could not be vented [Censored material] (Decree of 31 July 1981, On the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 6 (DZIENNIK USTAW, Item 99, No 20, 1981; revised in DZIENNIK USTAW, Item 204, No 44, 1983)). It is worth noting here that a substantial proportion of the rank-and-file members of the party and its allied parties are declared believers. Given the continuation of the existing rules for the composition of the leadership and of the guardians of the "Establishment," the existing gap will widen. This is confirmed by polls of young people 18 to 19 years of age, conducted in the spring of 1988: 96 percent of the respondents declared that they were believers, with 92 percent declaring, "Christ is the Son of God," 68 percent stating that they were regular practicing believers, 27 percent that they were irregular practicing believers, and 14 percent stating that they were members of Catholic organizations. In addition, 40 percent occasionally or regularly attended the meetings organized for young people by these organizations (CBOS [Public Opinion Survey Center] polls, July 1988).

The aforementioned contradiction between religiosity and politics creates in the awareness of Poles a tension, a dilemma between the feeling of justice, "ius," shaped by religion, and the law of the state, "lex." By "law" I mean here not only decrees, ordinances, regulations, and recommendations to executive agencies but also the manner of their enforcement. I know of no country whose government is not criticized by its citizens. The pileup of mistakes and distortions under our system of society is tangibly felt by the public in its daily life and graphically portrayed in the mass media. But let me draw attention to a deep stratum of awareness which, in accordance with the idea of this article, is not a "superstructure" but a "base" for selecting values, acknowledged rules of conduct, and for evaluating human aspirations. In their awareness, people at times attach importance to outwardly trivial facts which conflict with the established values, while at the same time not attaching importance to other, statistically documented accomplishments.

The need to respect the authorities, and fair-minded, efficient, and strong authorities at that, seems obvious to

Poles. The party, which formally acknowledges historical materialism and promotes it in schools, in the mass media, and through its longtime policy of restrictions on religion, cannot expect to be accepted by believing Catholics so long as it maintains its areligious orientation. The aforementioned obstacle to social integration consists in the existence of differences ensuing from different interpretations of the meaning of life and of the relationship between the individual and the community.

The church is interested in life not only in terms of its supernatural meaning but also in terms of daily work, honesty, etc. Where then are the causes of indolent work, disrespect for property, and absence of honesty in our Catholic society to be found? As regards individuals, the church recommends that their needs be considered the most important. The Primate Stefan Wyszyński in his *Świętokrzyska* homily "Homo oeconomicus" spoke of an ordering of love under which family needs are to be met first and only afterward the needs of the broader society. This ordering is deeply rooted in social awareness, and many studies of work motivation confirm that the most often mentioned reason for taking a job is to meet one's personal needs and those of one's family. Work is the foundation of property. Concern for property is inculcated from early childhood at home and in the family household. Nowadays in this country rearing for honest work and for concern for one's tools is still quite effective only on private farms. I believe that 40 years of lack of respect for property cannot remain without a trace. Here it should be borne in mind that Polish communists, who in 1945 had not followed their fellow communists in other countries and did not nationalize peasant farms, were the first to abandon compulsory cooperatives in 1956. The time has now come for [the authorities to permit] people to "buy and sell" their own and socialized property without any allocations or coupons issued by the bureaucratic Moloch, and engage in private enterprise without fearing that its profitability would be nullified by arbitrarily fixed taxes.

Dialogue and understanding in our national life depend on the manner in which postulates are worded and on adherence to moral principles. Here it should be emphasized that Polish communists began to eliminate restrictions on the publication and dissemination of views different from their own earlier and more broadly than the communists ruling other countries. The time has come for [the authorities to] broaden the possibilities for establishing associations and publishing periodicals and other publications so as to maintain a balance among the various groupings, and to abandon the requirements for permits and for the allocation of newsprint, presses, etc.

The third and last problem concerns a most broadly understood domain of cooperation. Every individual is different physically, mentally, and in the extent of his intellectual and occupational training. Throughout the world the nature of all kinds of trade in goods and services is continually broadening, as is the scope of



often disinterestedly provided aid. In particular the scope of cooperation among employees of increasingly numerous collective work establishments is growing.

Many of the creators of socialist and communist concepts were fascinated by the material success of the quondam "captains of industry" and by the effectiveness of the organization of social cooperation at the factory. They failed to perceive that the so-called industrial revolution was based on people inured to work and obedience in a peasant economy or raised from childhood on in the cult of work, thrift, and rationality in merchant families, or trained to do accurate and highly skilled work in traditional craftsmen's families. Nowadays we experience the deplorable effects of the from-the-top-down socialization of agriculture, trade, crafts, and services in all the socialist countries.

Certain inspirers of changes in Poland were aware of the might of the united action of working people, in particular as expressed in demonstrations and strikes. These were employed by the Russian proletariat in 1917, when it followed the slogans of the class struggle and the armed revolution. When transplanted onto present-day Polish soil, this strike method has produced different results.

The leaders and masses supporting NSZZ Solidarity organized demonstrations and strikes upon inviting priests to celebrate the mass in this connection: they availed themselves of religious symbols. Workers raised by the church did not resort to force and protested the use of physical force against them. The Nobel Prize awarded to Lech Walesa reflected the acknowledgment of peaceful world public opinion for this mode of protest and for the then initiated dialogue. However, this "necessary evil," as the strikes are defined by certain authors of works on Catholic social science (C. Strzeszewski) continues to be thought just that. Worker youth is especially prone to employ this type of protest.

Providence or, as some prefer to call it, historical determinism, in order to lead us out of the "Egyptian slavery" of conflicts, poses to us the alternative of either an economic and political catastrophe or an accord between the communist authorities and the religious and freedom-loving society. Building an accord requires abandoning the emulation of models arisen on the soil of societies shaped by other religious currents and other political fates.

Several conclusions ensue from the above reflections. In presenting them below I wish to state that they should promote national accord without being regarded as proposals for bargaining or as elements of the political game. The following I consider to be the most important conclusions:

—The PZPR should abandon dialectical materialism and cease discriminating against those of its members who believe in God, as well as cease propagating materialism in schools and in upbringing.

—The government should break up the monopolies, especially in agribusiness, and resolutely support the spread of (individual) private enterprise in trade, food catering, crafts, services, and consumer goods industry.

—Support for worker self-governments, independent trade unions, and autonomous civic institutions promoting private enterprise and grassroots cooperatives and caring for the moral and occupational level of their members.

—In the event that appropriate decisions are taken and progress is made in implementing them, workers should relinquish their right to strike, at least for the period needed to balance the consumer goods market.

## YUGOSLAVIA

### Elimination of Slovene Presidency Candidate Discussed

28000037 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian  
1 Nov 88 pp 16-17

[Article by Jasna Babic: "Questions Instead of a Program"]

[Text] Four equal candidates remained for one seat on the Presidium of Slovenia, Silvo Gorenc, Zivko Pregl, Ivan Ribnikar, and Igor Bavcar. Then Gorenc gave up the honor of being elected on behalf of Pregl and Ribnikar, whereupon Pregl gave up his candidacy in favor of Ribnikar. In this truly special election campaign Igor Bavcar was mentioned as an activist of the Committee for Protection of Human Rights, which a few days ago threatened an "unacceptable" communication, that is, an appeal for civil disobedience if Jansa, Zavrl, Tasic, and Borstner end up in jail before an inquiry is made into the constitutionality and legality of the Ljubljana trial before the Military Court.

Thus, in the nominating conference of the Slovenian Socialist Front on 27 October, after several rounds, Igor Bavcar was eliminated from further competition in the vote for membership in the State Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, although of all the candidates he had won the greatest support from the opstinas in Slovenia.

The party leadership of the northern republic probably sighed with relief: a place in the collective leadership of the state does not really bring with it any particular political influence, but for the army, for the rest of Yugoslavia, and indeed for Bavcar himself, this was a symbolic victory—according to some people, of the democratic political option; according to others, of the excessively radical and even destructive political option.



That is, the call for civil disobedience on the eve of the end of the election was such a flagrant political error that there were reactions to Igor Bavcar not only from Milan Kucan, president of the Slovenian party, but also from Ljubo Bavcon, chairman of the other Committee for Protection of Human Rights and Liberties of the Slovenian Republic Conference of the SAWP: How can a state based on law be defended by illegal and illegitimate means?

Nevertheless, the party and government team of Slovenia now faces a difficult problem—the political status of Bavcar's informal group of 20,000 individual followers and 300 collective followers and many, many more covert sympathizers. When its most lively member was eliminated from the election, the Committee for Protection of Human Rights—originally the Committee To Protect the Rights of Janez Jansa—lost not only its first and only opportunity for any sort of formal recognition, but also responsibility. What this means in practice is best indicated by a survey published in the last issue of MLADINA, in which 59 percent of the population polled said that “the approach of the committee is correct and therefore in future should extend to all areas of political life,” while only 2.7 percent think that this form of activity and association should be abolished. Assuming that the Slovenian leadership, the army, the rest of Yugoslavia, and Bavcar himself are not in the least mistaken in imagining him to be a synonym of the Committee for Protection of Human Rights, he represents more than an ordinary candidate for membership on the presidency of a Yugoslav republic. The trouble is that this way, now that he has been eliminated from the election procedure, Igor Bavcar means more than he did on his own.

“If the Committee for Protection of Human Rights did not have Igor Bavcar, it would have to invent him,” Mile Setinc has written in DELO, thereby unwittingly diminishing Bavcar's mystery. It is true that this is a person who is associated with a specific and individual case, that of Jansa, Tasic, Borstner, and Zavrl, and so the committee and its founder owe most of their popularity to what has happened in the Ljubljana Military Court. It is also true that this application of the articles of the military criminal code (to which no one had paid attention up to now) has suddenly “brought to mind” the relation between military powers and civil rights, issues which institutional Slovenian politics has not dealt with and still does not have valid answers to. But it is quite certain that Bavcar and his informal group are a phenomenon of many processes in Slovenia which would have taken a similar form one day even without the trial of the four men. For the sake of comparison: Janez Jansa first found himself before a military court in 1985 when he was suspected of the same crime, of divulging the secret of changes in required military service. At that time, however, he managed to prove that this information had previously been “leaked” in one of the meetings of the federal youth forums. But a conflict with military authorities was only a question of time....

The story of Igor Bavcar, then, is a story about a generation, about people on the threshold of their 4th decade who see it as their mission in society to open up new political horizons. It is no accident that Janez Jansa is not only Bavcar's first “client,” but also his best friend, to whom he is bound by their days of joint activism in leadership of the youth organization. If under certain other circumstances that personal biographic fact has no particular political importance, in Yugoslavia, which is homogenizing around diverse sentiments, it still says much about the emotional pattern of generational solidarity among the actual members of the committee, their defenders, and undoubtedly the majority of those who think like them—the 30-year-olds who missed all the revolutionary years, that is, a generation without any sort of historical legitimacy, but raised to serve that legitimacy without objection.

In the late seventies, Igor Bavcar was the editor in chief and managing editor of TRIBUNA, the weekly of Ljubljana university students, which had an entire series of title pages inscribed with the following words in red letters: “Long live the proletarian revolution.” During Bavcar's term as editor, TRIBUNA printed the poster of Lenin in Moscow, an immense photograph of the leader of the first socialist revolution and his closest collaborators in Red Square, with a magnificent Orthodox shrine in the background from which the crosses had been removed by retouching.

“We were obsessed with the idea that the key was concealed in Marxist theory.... It did not seem to us that the wrong approach had been taken with socialism, but just that it had not been taken to the end. We were so naive as to think that those in power had not read thoroughly enough the theory which they advocated. Only later did it become clear to us that they had not read anything and that we were not dealing with a theory misunderstood, but with a set of worn-out ideological patches,” he was to say 10 years later in an interview with MLADINA.

At that time, he was only a cadet who had graduated from a military school, a student in the School of Political Sciences, a member of the Presidium of the Slovenian Youth League, and undoubtedly inconsolable that he had been born too late for 1968. But even the transformation occurred altogether in keeping with his “ultra-Leninist” doctrine, as a wonderful example of materialist dialectics and of quantity passing over into quality, suddenly, but prepared by many objective circumstances. His friend Janez Jansa fell victim to his own convictions: because of his idea of modernizing nationwide defense he was removed from the position of chairman of the Commission for Nationwide Defense and Social Self-Protection. Bavcar left the youth organization in a similar way because he defended him. At just about that same time, he moved from the red TRIBUNA to the CASOPIS ZA KRITIKU ZNANOSTI [Journal for Criticism of Science], where he met and then succeeded



the first homegrown theoreticians of post-Marxism, philosophers and journalists who, instead of criticizing political economy and issues of Leninism, concerned themselves with language, structure, the exchange of opinions, psychoanalysis, speech as social practice, completely new worlds of logic and symbols which very rapidly in Ljubljana (by contrast with Zagreb) pass out of the academic precincts and together with punk rock become political trends involving large numbers of people. Then came the acquaintance with Stane Kavcic who with his recollections of the late sixties opened up to the former "ultra-Leninist" the problems of socialism and liberalism, of society and the party, of the party and ideology, of the state and law, of Slovenia and Yugoslavia, and above all of the victim and the system. The first significant product of this other Bavcar was the concept of civil society, the demand for a state based on law, the demand for opportunities to do civilian service in place of required military service, and certainly the work with Janez Jansa on the book of Kavcic's memoirs.

Thus, he became a "liberal."

"Ah, no!" he replied in MLADINA. "It is not so simple. Publishing the memoirs filled a historical gap. A part of history had been deleted as though it had not happened. All that was left was the curse word: liberalism. By no means did I share all of Kavcic's views, least of all the illusion that it was possible to join the figure of the devoted Communist and self-manager with the idea of a modern state. Kavcic is not a solution to everything for the present moment, but a warning about old mistakes. I agree with Tomaz Mastnak that that socialism would have been sacred, but with less freedom if the liberals would have won. I think, however, that none of the points of departure for understanding the position we live in today is possible or realistic. Publishing the memoirs was programmatic in the sense that now, at this moment, we need to pose the issues which could not be posed before, to utter the names which could not be mentioned before, and to say what could not even be thought before."

On the eve of the nominating conference of the Slovenian SAWP, where he lost the race with Ivan Ribnikar, unlike the other candidates, Igor Bavcar did not offer any special program. His political concepts do not differ anyway from the visions offered to the Slovenian citizenry by the official political structure. Nevertheless, the constituency in the opstina must have concluded that he guaranteed something more: wit or wisdom of "aphorisms"? "Economics is an alibi for political opportunism"; "I do not offer answers, but I do have some questions"; "The problem of my generation is the problem of political pluralism"—which Slovenian newspapers have quoted most frequently, creating the image of an impressive bearded figure challenging the breadth of Slovenian democracy. However, if the failure to elect Bavcar is the score in the game with "more suitable" and "unfit" candidates for a place in the Presidency of SR Slovenia, it is not just Milan Kucan, Joze Smole, or

Janez Stanovnik who are to blame, but all of Yugoslavia. And if all of Yugoslavia is to blame, then Igor Bavcar and the Committee for Protection of Human Rights share the blame with it, since not for a moment did they worry about the "Yugoslavization" of their principles as they defended civil liberties against political attacks in the easiest possible way: by shutting themselves off within the limits of their "unique" and truly tolerant "native land." The generation which has spoken so much about differences and thinks about systems of differences, about dialogue, about mutual exchange of arguments, nevertheless is egocentric in thinking most about its own specific nature, exclusively and militantly, just as in the period of its own "ultra-Leninism."

### **Possibility of Abolishing Youth Organization Examined**

28000039 Belgrade MLADOST in Serbo-Croatian  
7 Nov 88 pp 30-33

[Article by Aca Cvetovic: "Should the SSOJ Be Abolished?"; first paragraph is MLADOST introduction]

[Text] Participating in the quest for the lost organization and its membership were Velimir Curguz Kazimir, scholar and journalist from Belgrade; Dejan Jovic, reporter and youth activist from Zagreb; Lazar Zolt, member of the Presidency of the Conference of the SSOJ [Socialist Youth League of Yugoslavia] and president of the Council for Ideology; and Goran Mitic, president of the Commission for Statutory Questions of the Republican Conference of the SSO of Serbia. The starting point for this conversation was Dejan Jovic's text, "Why Should the SSOJ Be Abolished," the essence of which was contained in Jovic's part of the discussion. In the following article, MLADOST reveals the problem and the fourth reform (after economic, political and party reforms), through which young people could more clearly participate in tempestuous everyday events.

Dejan Jovic: My intention was to write a text on the subject of the possibility, in general, of there being a political organization of young people, or what the SSO is today, on the basis of its Statutes and its documents and in its practice, or rather with its forms of activities (through which we can analyze it, and on which level we have analyzed and criticized it for the most part thus far, etc.). No one is really satisfied with this organization. For 20 years, or rather for as long as the SSOJ has existed (14 years), the SSOJ and the organizations before it were always the subject of extremely bitter disputes about practice, about their activities and results, both inside these organizations and outside. And now, for example, when we look at how the SSOJ characterizes itself at congresses, meetings, in official documents, we see that there is not one single thing here in connection with which the SSOJ could say that this is its specific accomplishment, that it is satisfied, etc. For the most part, there are very negative assessments. Indeed, we are seeing an outpouring of criticism of this situation in the



SSOJ, on the level of that which is somewhat obvious, and this generally dwells on stereotyped explanations to the effect that the cadre or leadership of this organization is no good, or that there is no interest, or that the financial resources are lacking, or some similar reason. However, thus far one issue has been neglected, or at least I have not noticed anyone raising the question of the very foundation of the existence of the SSO, its formulation. With regard to the radical dissatisfaction with this organization, I think that it is very necessary that its foundations be finally tackled as well. It seems to me that we should start with the first point in the general principles of the Statutes of the SSOJ, because the SSOJ defines itself as a united, mass-participation, sociopolitical, educational organization. Defined in these terms, the SSOJ cannot exist as a united entity. This basic definition of the organization has caused everything that we have later identified as presumed causes, but they are actually the results of this formulation of the SSOJ. If we define unity and mass participation as the basis for the existence of any organization, then it is a lost organization. Both unity and mass participation are consequences; they cannot be decreed by any organization. Having a mass organization, counting on the potential membership of several millions of people, and seeking unity in that organization is absolutely impossible without defining what exactly all this means together—what do these concepts that are being used mean? However, defining an organization as a united and mass-participation group does have practical consequences. The practical consequences, on the one hand, are that the mass character is suspended in the name of unity, and this is manifested in such a way that partial interests are imposed as the interests of a generation, or as the general interest, and everything else is eliminated in the name of unity. If we follow the political conflicts that the SSOJ has endured from 1974 to the present time, whenever there has been a political program—and this has not always been the case (in fact, in the majority of cases there has not been one)—we have had a situation of the worst settling of accounts inside this organization, the most radical, most unrefined, and most undemocratic, if you wish, in order to attempt to sweep aside all possible differences in the name of unity, and to establish an official position—the so-called position of the organization—which then eliminates its mass character. On the other hand, option B is to avoid all possible concrete political themes about which disunity, or diversity, could arise, and that is the reason for the marginality of the SSOJ. The third element of this organization is its educational component. Defining an organization as educational in practical terms means consigning it to the group of other organizations with an educational function: schools, kindergartens... Institutions that are specialized and have different connections to education, especially the education of the young people that we are talking about here. Having an educational organization means having educators and having people who are educated; that is normal in any educational organization. The mere fact that a youth organization is an educational organization yields a result: It consists of a

stratum of educators, or rather a group of educators whose students are an entire generation, or even a broader group than that. This consequently means youth leadership constituted as an organization. And when you read the Statutes of the SSOJ today, you encounter passages such as how the SSO focuses the interests of the young generation; but how can it focus the interests of the young generation when it is the young generation? It says that it is educating a generation for participation in the political process, but how can it educate if it is the young generation? On the other hand, consequence B is that the educational function of a youth organization is understood as being that the SSOJ is the educator, that is, as that which educates, and in that case we have that which is being educated, which is outside the SSOJ, and this tells us something about the conveyance of the foundations of the Statutes. The three main tasks for which the SSOJ exists today are: to resolve the question of unemployment, to resolve the question of housing, and to resolve the general problems of the social crisis. These are all things that can be resolved only in the assembly, and not by some party or some separate, specific organization. Therefore, the SSOJ is significant only if it works on its own dissolution.

Historical experience speaks against organizing youth politically. The position of the 3rd Conference of the LCY is that there are no youth questions that are not also social ones, and that there are no social questions that are not also youth ones. Why then a separate organization? The position of the Statutes that the vital interests of the young generation are identical to the vital interests of the working class is problematic, since it does not define what a generation is, nor what a class is, nor anything whatsoever about it. This is an extremely common phrase. For example, you have the interest of unemployed people in getting a job and the interest of employed people in seeing that new people do not get jobs, but instead that they themselves have more income, meaning that their income is distributed primarily as personal income and their own production increases independently of new jobs. Thus, this will lead to opposition, but the SSOJ is basically not defining how it will resolve it in general terms.

#### The Market Is Important Here, Too

Velimir Curguz Kazimir: In order to set the entire matter in motion, we would have to break it down into several levels. The issue of the SSOJ is, as it has been for so many years, such a complex problem that I think that we cannot elaborate on it here, nor can we even seriously take up the subject. Specifically, Dejan has indicated some of the most direct problems associated with the Statutes, with the organization's position, its establishment and so on; he has indicated a number of nonsensical elements, paradoxes, formalisms that mean nothing to anyone else. Not entering into certain historical assumptions here, nor into the theoretical question of the meaning of a political organization itself, i.e., of the party in Yugoslavia, which is a central question, we are



now in fact beginning to again think about proposals for a reform of the LC [League of Communists]. We are beginning to think about how the youth will be reformed, and the youth to a certain extent have in fact already reformed spontaneously—the same way they have disbanded. Among the youth, everything is done in the sense that they do not exist as an organization. I do not know what sensible things to say on this occasion, aside from some associations that occurred to me while I was listening to Dejan. We are struggling today for a market economy, that is the standard battle cry, and at the same time the question arises of to what extent political organizations are prepared to move towards that market. The economic market has its own laws, just as the political market too has its own laws. Currently in Yugoslavia, I see only one successful (relatively speaking) organization in terms of the market—the LC, which is succeeding economically in financing itself, primarily from its membership dues, and then from various other types of activities. This makes me think that it is as if the SSOJ were abroad under the care of Comintern and now must come into the country and begin to exist like an independent organization, seeing to its own interests, with its own membership, program and everything that pertains to a political organization. However, we have in fact not yet cleared up the question of whether the SSOJ, the youth, even constitutes a political organization. The SSOJ in the Statutes, and elsewhere, is a sociopolitical organization. But we—and this will probably take a long time—are still unable to regard it as a political organization with independent goals, with an independent program; rather, we see it within the framework of all other organizations. And thus it is not at all strange that its plans, desires and programs overlap with those of other organizations, first and foremost, its program and method of operation. Most closely linked to the labor unions. I think that we will increasingly be facing the question of what do labor unions actually do. And it seems to me that if the labor unions (this is not criticism of the labor unions, this is criticism, one might say, of everything, and in that context of the labor unions as well), if the problems and programs of the labor unions become the programs of the membership, meaning people who are associated with the labor unions, then in that case there are many doubts and much overlap in terms of youth to be straightened out. Naturally, the youth, like all other political organizations, will then be able to struggle for certain principles, and not just for seeing to it that young people get housing and jobs. One principle that I see that youth can struggle for today is that we have a normal market economy. But on the other hand, it in fact seems to me that among young people today, as we must be aware, the most ubiquitous and obvious view is a voluntaristic inclination that calls into doubt the market, or rather the harsh laws of the market economy, which is in a certain sense normal: It is the youth who will be hit hardest by it, it is the youth who will essentially be the ones, dare I say the slave labor, upon whom all this will fall. I am not sure if all young people are aware of this. This pursuit of voluntarism, of justice,

equality, etc., is somehow simply present in young people; it seems to me that it is from education and from a certain tradition (I would not say biology), and it is natural that this resistance is present. And very often, the youth leadership goes this way in order to express approval of this general mood, without regard for the extent to which they have hidden behind the principle of the market and the principle of the economy. A youth organization would not dare initiate or support political action that it itself cannot put into effect. Secondly, it seems to me that one should develop some principles, criteria for the way in which one can (and this again depends on the Constitution and on constitutional changes) be directly involved in the redistribution of political power in this country. And the third point: that it must be organized more concretely. This is now a popular cry, the so-called gathering of interests and organization of young people. The fact is there are many concrete projects which could involve youth. Everything that is associated with the future, especially the immediate future, be it information science, ecology, the technological revolution, openness and links to the rest of the world, or coming together on the basis of direct, open forums, open clubs. There would be a much more suitable and appropriate nucleus for beginning to develop and assemble people if they knew that the organization, among other things, provided young people with genuine support early on, if nothing else, about how to open up their business premises, their workshop...

Moreover, a youth organization must be far more radical in all this. And so, when we say democracy, it is just an empty phrase, but we say that the youth must struggle for freedom of the press, that the youth must incorporate this into legal ordinances, that the youth must struggle for small, independent publishers, independent, small printers, etc. Still, I am not against professionalism. I would even rather see a couple of professionals in their sixties in this youth organization, but people who will do everything to open up paths to young people and to help them professionally, than to go along with some sort of generational sectarianism. But finally, I think that until we have resolved these initial reasons for problems concerning organizing youth into political parties, or rather political organizations, and forming relations with other organizations, until we can see where the resources will come from, until youth begin to work for themselves and emerge on the market, I do not see the possibility of any radical—i.e., essential change.

#### The Youth Are Not Young

MEADOST: Since Goran and Lazar have for quite some time had the opportunity to work within the SSO on various levels of its organization, it would not be a bad idea for us to cast all these questions just raised by Dejan and Kazimir into a concrete political perspective, or rather the perspective of organizations within which they are active. Have these ideas pertained to the Yugoslav or Serbian youth organization?



Lazar Zolt: I would add a few things. I would look for the origin of everything that is happening in our society, including the position of sociopolitical organizations, their failure to function, in the system itself. Right now, I have the opportunity to publicly ask the youth of Yugoslavia a question: How do they view this youth organization? Is it a league in the true sense of the word, as its name indicates, or is it a league in formal terms but actually an assemblage of republican-provincial and other organizations? Naturally, it is recognized that it is more the latter and that in fact all our sociopolitical organizations are actually the latter. I will return later to that territorial or functional principle of organizing. In my opinion, one of the directions of reform and transformation in the SSO should be in the direction that I sometimes call, half in jest and half in earnest, a league of socialist youth organizations at the least, but not a league of socialist youth organizations of the republics and provinces, but rather organizations organized on the basis of function. On the other hand, I myself wonder and also ask others: why not include individuals from this youth organization of ours in the League of Socialist Youth? We have gone a little too far in our "organizing" and parceling out (perhaps this is a negative effect from associated labor since its parceled-out divisions are reflected in the youth organization, or rather in social and political organizations in general), so that the individual cannot act any way other than through his basic organization. I am in favor of the individual being able to act. The stronger individuals, the stronger the youth organization.

The second question, having to do with the territorial or functional principle of organizing, is this: If we accept the League of Socialist Youth as a league of youth organizations, then the question is, which youth organizations, of course. It is clear that all of us here are a priori opposed to republican-provincial or assemblies of republican-provincial youth organizations, because that has proven to be bad, a failure.

The system is construed as one ideal, common system, and it is thus within the context of this construct that the situation of youth and youth organizations is found. Thus, we come to what Dejan said, that this organization is improbably defined as united and highly mass-oriented, and that a number of things have changed completely.

#### Fluctuation of Problems

When the question revolves around a youth organization, the fundamental reason for its weakness and everything else, and the crisis into which it has lapsed, it is my view that it has actually never been a young organization, it has never been structured as a young organization, and it has never acted as an expression of the interests of the youth of Yugoslavia.

One thing that has already been proven as being present and as something that we must take into account is the reflection of the new social movements in our country, whatever our position towards them. They have simply

come into being. (I must digress for a moment. At a symposium in Cavtat, an Italian feminist talked about the new social movements during discussion by Yugoslav participants: "Whatever you want, you have the largest new social movement, look at what is happening at the rallies of solidarity with Serbs and Montenegrins. Is a bigger social movement necessary?") In concrete terms, the provincial conference of the youth of Vojvodina hit it right on the head by organizing over the course of the past year a so-called ecology caravan. This went around to several of the most threatened places in the province, I mean ecologically threatened, and was incredibly well received by the working people and citizens. Of course, by everyone except the official structures that were active in those areas, with exceptions, I must note.

Velimir Curguz Kazimir: That occurred to me earlier. And I see how no one talks about this thing, which was very feasible and simple. It is a matter of the position of social organizations. Everywhere in the West, social organizations are either of special significance, directly subsidized by the state, or are left up to the market, but that market has a specific quality. Specifically, within the tax system it is possible to get major breaks as a successful businessman or as a successful business organization if one invests resources in the areas of culture, art, science and various social organizations. I am convinced, I guarantee (just as a cafe manager in Bosnia financed a trip by the chess club that presumably meets in his cafe to the chess Olympics in Pula) that if such a tax policy were implemented and pursued, tomorrow there would be a very large number of people living and working in this country—but also those outside the country—who would directly finance (freed in some way from the problem with taxes) various social organizations, be it the Pioneers, some amateur theater, etc. Now I am interested in whether concrete work has even been done on this.

Goran Mitic: I have come with one hypothesis and question: Is it possible to have democratic action by a league of youth for democracy and, I might add, socialism? If there is a need to think about political pluralism, can we and do we dare stop at the classic, recognized forms of indirect political pluralism within the framework of political parties, or can we go further? Especially in the sense of provisions for theoretical assumptions, sociological ones in particular, about civil society. In the areas of the creative influence of the individual on mechanisms at which is aimed the certain amount of social development that will always have to exist. Thus, it seems to me that it is appropriate that such democratic youth action leagues exist for democracy and socialism if they give us some embryo of alternative political thought—to facilitate our empirical and theoretical transition to thinking about political pluralism.

One thing that we have already learned from social movements as we have perceived them thus far. There is a defined solution to the problem, a great deal of



motivation to solve the problem, a perception of the fundamental social mechanism whereby it is being resolved, a valuable disposition towards the very solution that is being mobilized, and a great deal of faith from those who are taking part in the collective of interests that is bringing about the final resolution. Hence their fluctuation, from one problem that will conceivably result in a solution or the mobilization of all influential elements on the question, to the shift to a new possibility. In any case, there is a positive identification to projecting the solution to the established problem on whatever level. This is what we have learned from the movements: They live flexibly precisely because they have that model of political action in the sense of problem and solution. I think that the essence of it is in some theoretical assumption, that we must radically break with the definition of the League of Socialist Youth, which immediately, in its first rendering, introduces a league on which it is possible to build a new, and I might even say, a political model—and at the same time, like a cuckoo lays eggs, introduces an organization that immediately presupposes everything that has been defined. An organization of totalities that implies more power and control than the power of knowledge and control over the economy, entrepreneurs, and creative work; that sees people more as a shadow than as creators. That is the essence, and that is what we have to overcome. This means that this could be the first assumption for a redefinition right now, a total break with one such starting point.

#### Functions for Citizens

MLADOST: Thus, perhaps not even reforms, but rather a redefinition of the youth political organization. Perhaps we should discuss this a little. The members of the SSO must adopt the Marxist view of the world as their own, which is nevertheless debatable, because in this case there is practically no difference between the SSO and the LC in this ideological framework.

Dejan Jovic: There are no special reasons for us to make the SSO into a league for democracy and socialism, because the issue of democracy and socialism is not in any way associated only with the youth population, or to that criterion that is the youth organization. It seems to me that we must establish a situation whereby in general we cannot look at youth the same way that we look at them today, in statutory terms and in terms of practice, whereby we regard them as one homogenous group that

is automatically progressive... Of course, this must then imply that a youth organization can be a league for democracy and socialism, but also a league against democracy and socialism. In short, we cannot talk as if one entire generation (the youth perhaps least of all, since this is expressed among them most visibly, most clearly and most radically) is unambiguously defined as progressive or as specific.

MLADOST: What is it that corresponds to the current social situation if we speak of the market as a principle of conduct. Does this mean a market for ideas, a political market, etc.? By what means can the youth move toward that political market, and in what manner?

Dejan Jovic: We have a situation where there are no young people in the assemblies now, where it is difficult there to adopt any legislation that is specifically youth-oriented. In Croatia, for example, it was the law on financing these holiday social leagues. Accordingly, today we do not have a grasp of the teams, administrative and political, who currently hold seats in the assemblies where this is being decided, and how are we going to have this after we abolish the SSOJ? Naturally, there is a very simply answer to this question.

We no longer have parliamentary delegates as delegates of the citizenry, but rather as delegates of the SSOJ on the sociopolitical council. There are none elsewhere, because the logic is, "You have your organization, and anyway, there are people here who are older and who have some political experience," and a whole bunch of other arguments, and then it is normal that we have, on the one hand, an assembly that takes this into consideration, and on the other hand a youth organization that is continually complaining and trying to shake things up in the DPV. Actually, instead of a league [savez], we have a cage [kavez], and that is a fact. In short, I do not support abolishing the youth organization in order to leave us with an organization of old people, but rather creating completely new ones that would not be divided according to the principle of old-young. In this way, we would have a grasp on the assembly. A person in an assembly would not count on his organization or mechanism—since he is automatically not responsible to youth because here in the DPV there is a delegation of the League of Socialist Youth—but rather would be responsible to the entire citizenry that elected him. In this way, we would give citizens a function they actually do not have now.



## POLAND

### Short History of Economic Reform, Terminology

26000244 Czesochowa NIEDZIELA in Polish  
No 49, 4 Dec 88 p 7

[Article by Juliusz Jan Braun, based on excerpts compiled from "Encyklopedia powszechna" [Universal Encyclopedia], PWN Press, and from Polish Press Agency communiques: "A History of the PRL Economy in a Nutshell"]

[Text] We shall leave out here the entire period of "laying the foundations" and subsequent "consolidation" and begin with the recent history of reforming the Polish economy.

When in the 1960's it turned out that the possibilities for extensive growth were definitely becoming exhausted, there appeared the magic keyword **incentives**.

"Material incentives" (generally linked to the name of the then economic reformer Boleslaw Jaszczyk), were the call signal, so to speak, which led to the reform. "However, relatively ineffective and isolated changes in the system of planning, management, and material incentives took place."

The changes prompted by the events of December 1970 [workers' massacre] led to a new program called the **strategy of dynamic growth**.

The objectives of this strategy were "a systematic improvement in the living, social, and cultural conditions of the society." This was envisaged as happening by means of "a dynamic growth of productive forces and social productivity of labor; scientific-technical and organizational progress; modernization of the nation's economic structure; and enhanced effectiveness of management." In 1971 the Party-Government Commission for Modernizing the Operation of the Economy and the State was appointed. A new concept was developed as part of this strategy, namely, the **LEO reform**, meaning a reform based on Large Economic Organizations.

However, this concept gradually disappeared from the terminology of official speeches and propaganda articles. In 1975 the **program for further systematic improvements in the material and cultural living standards of the society** was adopted.

Soon, however, that program proved to be not so perfect as expected, and thereupon the **economic maneuver** was proclaimed.

That "maneuver" did not stop the rapidly progressing crisis. August 1980 [Solidarity] came, and shortly afterward it was followed by the **economic reform**.

The basic assumptions of the reform were published in January 1981. "The reform cannot be stopped, and implementing it is urgent, but it is even more important that the reform cannot fail," the assurances were given.

Events followed each other rapidly. In July 1981 the government **plan for overcoming the crisis and stabilizing the economy** was proclaimed.

The purpose of that plan was to "halt the decline in output and initiate its rise, restore a balanced market and protect consumer living standards, restore order on the investment front, revamp the structure of employment, restore the balance of payments, and initiate export-oriented structural changes in the economy." At the same time it was predicted, "It can be expected that the crisis in the basic domains can be surmounted in 3 to 6 years; there is no shortcut to this." In the second half of the year there also appeared the controversial **interim measures** said to commence the reform.

Soon after martial law was proclaimed, in 1982 price hikes were announced as an indispensable element of the reform, as it was put. "Let us hope that a new stage in price policy has commenced, that flexibility and moderation shall henceforth be the principal feature of this policy, and that economic regulators will also prove effective in reducing cost and improving quality."

In 1985 the **3-Year Stabilization Plan** came to an end.

"We are closing the first, pioneering stage of the reform," it was written, on announcing at the same time that the years 1986-90 "are to be a period of not only catching up with the arrears but also recovering the economy's ability for balanced growth."

In 1987 the **second stage of the reform** was proclaimed.

"This program, when consistently implemented, should within 3-4 years result in completely overcoming the consequences of the crisis in this country and eliminating the current vexations of daily life due to market shortages, inflation, and poor performance of public services. We aspire to creating an economy which can provide every able-bodied citizen with a chance to improve his living standards through industrious work and creative initiative."

The program for the second stage of the reform was closely linked to the **price operation**.

"Assuring realistic prices and wages as well as other parameters is the criterion for effective mechanisms of the reform. This concerns changing the price structure," it was proclaimed, upon announcing at the same time a 2- or 3-year "difficult period."

And last, there is the most recent chapter, in 1988: the **plan for consolidating the national economy**.



The purpose of this plan is to "improve market supply, purchasing conditions, and consumer services, as well as to halt steep inflation and environmental pollution, and eliminate bureaucratic barriers and soulless officialdom as well as other vexations and annoyances of quotidian life."

**CEMA: Trade, Currency Reform Needed, Not Bilateral Exchange**

26000221 Warsaw PRAWO I ZYCIE in Polish  
No 48, 26 Nov 88 p 13

[Article by Ryszard Czarniewski: "A Helpful Council or an Infirm One?"]

[Text] In January of next year CEMA will observe its 40th anniversary. But, although in 4 years the last economic restrictions and barriers between the countries making up the EEC, formed in 1957, will have disappeared, for Polish enterprise the ability to freely sell goods in another CEMA country, not to mention investing, is just as unrealistic as it was 10 or 20 years ago. In any case, it is the same with regard to the free movement of the citizens of CEMA countries between these countries, or the ability to take a job in any of them. Naturally, we cannot automatically compare everything between CEMA and EEC, if only because the philosophy of both these groupings differs. But looking at what has been done, it has been hard not to wonder whether a more adequate name for this organization would not be the Council of Mutual Economic Infirmity.

CEMA was, and still is to a large degree, a creature more political and ideological than economic. After all, it is no accident that it was formed in 1949. The economic model advanced and implemented at that time, linked to the concept of rapid industrialization, did not have much in common with the formation of complementary economic structures in CEMA countries, which would facilitate the development of commodity exchange, to say nothing of other forms of economic cooperation.

There was a slight movement in this area in later years when coordinated planning began, attempts were made to introduce specialization into specific types of production, and joint economic organizations were formed. But it cannot be said that the results of these actions were satisfactory. Certainly, beautifully sounding programs were announced, such as, for example, "The Principles of International Socialist Division of Work," in 1961, or "A Comprehensive Program to Intensify and Improve the Development of the Socialist Economic Integration of CEMA Member Countries," in 1971. But to a large degree these plans remained unimplemented, because as a matter of fact, none of the states making up this organization was interested, for one reason or another, in executing them. The authorities of the respective countries concentrated primarily on ensuring domestic economic balance and there were no strong incentives, either political or economic, to develop economic cooperation on the international plane in the area of the socialist community.

In addition, the shape of CEMA also changed. Originally, the territorial scope of this organization was limited to Europe. Omitting the cultural, historical and other differences which separate the respective countries, there was, even then, a difference of potentials among them. On the one hand, the Soviet Union, on the other, the medium-size states with a differentiated economic level—for example, Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Romania. The situation was complicated further when Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam were later accepted into the Council. The "mutual economic assistance" embodied in the name then had to take on the form of a distinctly one-way street. And after all, even the most developed CEMA countries, laying out sums of money for the weaker ones, were not among the wealthiest countries of the world.

The mechanisms of cooperation between the CEMA countries duplicated the orders-directives system in effect for many years. All matters were taken care of at the "top" in the form of agreements on at least the ministerial level, and the enterprises were left the role of executor. The parties on high, agreeing among themselves, determined who is to deliver what and how much, and later if a partner wanted to receive a little more of a given commodity, the participation of the agreeing parties was again required, otherwise the balances affirmed at the highest levels would be disturbed.

All of this functioned without any great results, but also without any great discord, until in some of the CEMA countries thought began to be given to changing the system for managing the economy, to a return to economic laws. Hungary, later we, and now the Soviet Union, when they began to reform their economy, realized that without a change in the mechanisms of CEMA operation there could be no thought about a further development of this organization. Let us take a look at such a basic matter as trade in CEMA. I did not say "within the framework" of CEMA, because there is none. What there is now is based on bilateral long-term agreements and annual protocols which, over a very large area, define what, for example, Poland will export to Bulgaria and what it will receive in return. This has to balance, for credit is granted very reluctantly (because of the difficulties in balancing their own economies, only a few states are willing to give it). Of necessity, therefore, such bilateral agreements limit exchange to the capabilities of the economically weaker partner.

Common sense suggests another solution. Namely, since, let us assume, Poland is in debt to Hungary, and, in turn, our debtor is Vietnam, why cannot we deduct this debt from our liability? Well, we cannot, because even though this is theoretically possible, there is no one willing to apply those rules of play. Although this is an organization of many states, the settlement of accounts is based on the principle of bilateralism.

CEMA mechanisms arose at a time when the omnipotent central government knew about everything and decided everything. Such a solution had its advantages because it



was certain that a given commodity would be shipped. But this was suitable for a stable economy, in which everything is done in accordance with the plan. Now, when in some socialist countries, concepts are being reevaluated and there is a return to a market economy, when it is believed that what should be produced should be decided not by the central authorities but by the enterprise, and that at the same time everywhere, to a greater or lesser degree, the crisis in the present system of management is making itself known, CEMA mechanisms have become an anachronism, which limits the possibilities of cooperation.

What, then, instead? Exactly. Opinions in the family on this subject are divided. Some of its members (Romania and the GDR) believe that there is no need to make any kind of serious changes. At the other extreme are the Hungarians who demand that convertible currencies be introduced into CEMA. In any case, this is a key matter which would facilitate the transformation of the present bilateral settlement of accounts into multilateral.

The issues connected with such basic concepts as money, price, exchange rate, are, in CEMA practice, still unexplored territory. Only now is the Council concerning itself seriously with such problems, which, if not solved—and I stress this—will make cooperation within the framework of CEMA impossible. The transferable ruble in its present form is only a statistical converter, not exchangeable for gold or hard currency. Nor are the moneys of the respective CEMA countries convertible.

Therefore, since it becomes essential to depart from the primitive exchange of goods for goods, what is supposed to fulfill the role of intermediary? One possibility is to gradually give the transferable ruble the function of a true money. The second, and this seems to be more realistic, is to gradually give the moneys of the respective countries the features of convertibility. The first steps in this area have already been taken. For example, it has been agreed upon between Poland and the Soviet Union that in specific categories of turnovers, a Polish enterprise will be able to sell its goods for rubles on the Soviet market and that these same rubles will be spent there. The Soviet exporter will act similarly.

This is not the first agreement of this type. But what is more important is that although it always constitutes something new in CEMA, it is a solution with a very limited scope, especially if we look at this matter from the viewpoint of CEMA. Past attempts in this area are bilateral agreements, pertaining to only some types of turnovers. But we will probably have to wait a long time yet before our enterprises will be able to exchange rubles earned on export to the USSR for forints, and import from Hungary the goods that they need.

Thus the attempts made thus far to install money-market instruments into the mechanism of CEMA operation are timorous experiments and not decisive steps which would allow the members of this organization to go beyond their own boundaries.

In any case, there is a way out of this stalemate caused by the partners' different approaches to reform.

If the new solutions do not suit some countries, they do not have to accept them. After all, the principle of consensus which has until recently been strictly binding in CEMA decisionmaking, does not mean that everyone must agree. Those states which believe that it is essential to reconstruct the instruments of cooperation as quickly as possible, should do so. Theoretically, there is nothing standing in the way of the formation of a small CEMA, for example, made up of three or four countries in which different, than in the past, rules of play will apply. Adhering to the present binding or timorous measures does not produce much, particularly since economic integration is not only economic cooperation. It is also an entire series of issues, about which we frequently forget.

For that matter, all CEMA activities thus far have occurred in areas so far removed from the life of the average citizen that practically speaking, the only tangible proof of the existence of this organization, in his eyes, is the huge building in Moscow and the reports in the newspapers, which appear at least once a year, informing about further deepening, strengthening, improving, intensifying, developing, etc., etc.

It is good, it may be said, that there are such organizations as the "International Center of the Academy of Sciences of Socialist Countries for the Improvement of Staff Qualifications on the Problem of 'Mass Heat Exchange,'" or the "International Organization for the Cooperation of High Power and High Tension Research Laboratories 'Interelektrotest,'" because if they have been organized they must surely be very necessary. But why, after almost 40 years of CEMA existence, for example, do Polish shoes have one size-numbering system, GDR shoes another, and Hungarian likewise. And that an extension cord purchased in Moscow cannot be plugged into a Polish electrical outlet? Which is exactly the point.

#### **GAZETA BANKOWA Editor on Banking Needs, New Magazine**

26000216 Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY in Polish No 47, 20 Nov 88 p 8

[Interview with Ryszard Kowalski, editor in chief, GAZETA BANKOWA, by Jan Cipiur: "In the Beginning There Was Money;" place and date not given]

[Text]

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] There already are so many periodicals on the newsstands. How was GAZETA BANKOWA conceived?

[Kowalski] The concept was simple; it accompanied the idea of the banking reform, the realization that the economic reform has no chances unless there is a sea



change in the attitude to the role of the national currency in the economy or, to put it another way, unless economic processes are regulated by a money economy. The experience of every developed country indicates that the banking system must be completely independent of the government and the economic administration. And the principal purpose of the central bank of the state is to strengthen the national currency.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Mr Editor, we have been despising money for so many years and you want us suddenly to respect it.

[Kowalski] I believe that people who sometimes are short of money before their payday respect every zloty, and if they feel contempt, it is for something else. As for resistance toward the option outlined here, it exists and shall continue to exist. We also are aware where to expect that resistance from. For years decisionmakers have been accustomed to easy money. They have always been capable of understanding that there may be shortages of steel or energy, but they refused, and some of them still continue refusing, to accept the eventuality of a shortage of money. This has to be reversed.

For several decades the concept of capital has been considered shameful, if not politically reprehensible, in Poland. Fortunately, by now there is sufficiently great understanding of the position that without a capital market, without the primacy of the money economy, there can be no economic growth. But acceptance of that position is not everything. What is also needed is acceptance of the attendant consequences.

One consequence is acceptance of the idea of curtailing the state's role in the economy, without thereby negating so-called state interventionism. The problem is that interventionism in its traditional Polish edition means ineffective if not primitive action.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] You are creating a team of incorrigible optimists strong in the power of the pen, aren't you?

[Kowalski] Rather, say, strong in the power of the intellectual potential of the banking community, which is manifesting itself clearly together with the banking reform.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] Do you only want to provide information, or do you also want to make creative contributions?

[Kowalski] The process of the changes we are postulating has already begun. We don't want to be merely its observers. We believe that we shall help accelerate it. GAZETA BANKOWA wants to be a guidepost in strengthening the currency. It shall oppose anything and anyone who will obstruct this process.

Now that it is known that the laws of economics are independent of ideology, now that such concepts as profits, letter of exchange, interest rate, etc., are returning to use, we must also play an educational role, we must jog collective memory. I expect as soon as next year things to occur that would prompt every Polish manager, both in the socialized and in the private sectors, to look at his desk each Monday for the latest issue of GAZETA BANKOWA with information which will help him in his economic choices.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] What kind of information will that be?

[Kowalski] The banks will begin to apply realistic and variable interest rates to both depositors and borrowers. Every entrepreneur who is looking for a loan or who happens to have liquid capital which he could deposit in a bank account for 3 or 6 months in order to earn interest, will attentively peruse reports on the interest rates proposed by the banks. The differentiation of these rates will be the first symptom of competition among banks. It may be that I am too optimistic, but I believe that we are destined to take this road. The only unknown is whether we shall proceed on it slowly or rapidly.

We also want to publish the balance sheets of shareholding companies. It is often forgotten that these companies are legally obligated to make such balance sheets public. We will moreover publish the balance sheets of all firms which desire such publicity, whether to strengthen their credibility vis a vis trade partners or to repudiate claims that their economic situation is weak.

Instead of saying more let me refer you to the prime source: the first few issues of GAZETA BANKOWA have already appeared.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] You have put together an interesting team of editors, associates, and, I believe, allies—Bratkowski, Fikus, and, in issue No 1, Baka. Attentive readers will probably infer political conclusions from these names.

[Kowalski] GAZETA BANKOWA is not a political periodical, and its publication of articles by individuals of differing political orientations is to me proof that we are reaching normalcy. Secondly, this is also proof that money alone is the factor creating authentic bonds between the citizen and the state, a factor to which division into leftwingers, rightwingers, reactionaries, and liberals is alien.

But in a sense GAZETA BANKOWA is a political periodical, since giving primacy to a money economy is a political choice. For this means a particular attitude toward the state's role in the economy, toward methods of management, and toward the question of freedom of economic activity [free enterprise].



We shall be political in the sense that we want to influence the attitude of the public toward businessmen, individuals who amass wealth. I need not mention that for many years being well-off meant being subject to social odium and opprobrium or existing behind a curtain of an equivocal silence. A country that lacks rich citizens cannot be a rich country.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] This idea has already become popular. In general, are there still people who do not accept it?

[Kowalski] We are aware that our choice may provoke the most conservative forces which, under the pretext of defending so-called political or ideological principles, that is, in reality, defending dogmas that by now are devalued, will oppose that choice with all their might.

An attendant peril is the possibility that support for forces of that kind might be provided by those who fail to adapt themselves to a money economy, who have not matured, or who have not learned what it requires. And they will defend themselves.

It is a unique paradox that the Polish society, which is thought to be negatively disposed toward its current political system, is in reality thoroughly permeated by the idea of the state as the mentor and guardian. Another widespread belief is that wages are not remuneration for labor but largely an allowance to offset the cost of living.

[PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY] What will be the purpose of your initial jousts?

[Kowalski] The first joust on a beaten field, a joust which I wish would be avoided, will concern a reform of the banking system. For the point is not the appearance of nine new plaques [nine new commercial banks]. The point is to create a situation in which the central bank will merely determine the limits of the money-credit policies adopted by the Parliament while the commercial banks will be free to operate as they see fit within these limits, meaning that they will be free to develop their own credit systems and conduct their own assessments and analyses as the basis for accepting or rejecting loan applications. Depriving the commercial banks of this opportunity for autonomy and relegating their role to that of regional branches of the National Bank of Poland would mean nullifying the banking reform. The fate of this joust will probably be decided once the final draft of the new banking law is decided upon. Probably for the first time as regards an economic decree, the legislators will not be pressured by the major lobbies. But I may be wrong. For there may occur a collision with those whom the traditional system of economic management suits, those whom Prime Minister M. F. Rakowski probably meant when he spoke in the Parliament about eradicating the remnants of Stalinism. We shall also always speak out in defense of the independence of the National Bank

of Poland and against any attempt to violate the money-in-circulation policy, that is, attempts to force the Bank to print more money than the economy's possibilities warrant.

An economy ruled by money may result in many disputes, but at least the rules for resolving them are then objective.

#### **Agricultural Co-op President on Current Status, Role of Co-ops**

26000223 Warsaw *CHLOPSKA DROGA* in Polish  
No 44, 30 Oct 88 p 3

[Interview with Jerzy Dabrowski, president, Central Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives, by Waldemar Gontarski: "Are Agricultural Co-ops Really Co-ops?"; date and place not given]

[Text]

[CHLOPSKA DROGA] When were the first agricultural production cooperatives formed in our country?

[Dabrowski] Almost at the moment of liberation from the German occupation and the implementation of agricultural reform. Land-subdivision co-ops took over the management of the large estates. But we use 16 December 1948 as the historical date when this form of management was legally sanctioned.

Since that time, through the application of various methods as well as pressure, the organization developed rapidly. The peak, 10,500 co-ops, was reached in 1956. Between 1957 and 1970 there was a radical turnaround in farm policy and most of the co-ops were liquidated. Not until 1970 did forms of management in agriculture become stabilized, allowing co-op management to become stronger and its organization to develop.

[CHLOPSKA DROGA] Please describe the current status of cooperatives.

[Dabrowski] There are over 2,200 of them. Most of them are in the Opole and Poznan voivodships. They have over 190,000 members. They farm almost 770,000 hectares of land, i.e., 3.7 percent of all of the arable land, most of it scattered and not of the best agricultural quality. We conduct modern farming. That is why the yield of our grains and other plants exceed the average of all of agriculture and our animal stocks are much larger, with the exception of cattle. We are not ashamed of our commodity production, either. From every hectare of arable land we sell over 14 quintals of grain and as much as 345 kilograms of livestock for slaughter. Farm-food processing has become our domain, but we are also involved in other activities as required by the needs of the community. We are proud of our wise and committed co-op self-management and our management staff.



[CHLOPSKA DROGA] A considerable number of co-ops have lasted only because they undertook activity having little to do with agriculture.

[Dabrowski] That is not true. The basis of our existence always has been and will be agriculture. The countryside is our field of action and the land is our basic occupation. Just as the countryside is subject to the processes of culturization and the modernization of production processes, so co-op farming is modernizing. In creating a modern farming workshop we are trying to associate it with the future, with what a given stage in the development of the country's economy requires.

It is hard to acknowledge that our processing, trade or gastronomic activities, or that our repair and construction, land reclamation or recultivation groups, have nothing in common with agriculture. We are creating them not only for ourselves. We want to take part in solving the problems of the community, the village and the gmina, and we do nothing which is not needed. Do we make money on this? Certainly, but is this a disgrace? Does this allow us to survive? This is only an illusion, because before we undertake a new direction of activity we must first invest in it, and this takes money which, as a rule, comes from agriculture. But I agree that this activity improves the economic situation, especially now, when the profitability of farm production has become problematical.

[CHLOPSKA DROGA] But in Baniocha near Warsaw the Farm Production Cooperative (RSP) proved that milk production can be a very lucrative operation. The dairy co-ops do not find the supplying of milk to shops to be very profitable. On every liter they receive a subsidy from the state. Yet somehow no one adds money to the milk from Baniocha.

[Dabrowski] But the citizen pays a good price for this. "Milk straight from the cow"—that is what appears on the half-liter plastic bags—is sold at a market price of 136 zlotys a liter. Despite this price, it is very popular in the six shops of this cooperative. Everybody is satisfied. The customers are able to buy a guaranteed, high-quality, product. The persons employed to milk the cows earn 75-90,000 zlotys a month. The cows give almost 4,300 liters a year, because they are given excellent care and fed well. The modern cow-barn last year brought a loss of 5 million zlotys, but now is beginning to pay for itself.

[CHLOPSKA DROGA] But not everyone is able to pay 136 zlotys for 1 liter.

[Dabrowski] If we allocate today's mass subsidies to the price of finished food products to an increase in consumers's wages, the situation will change.

[CHLOPSKA DROGA] Can such high-quality farms as those in Baniocha be found in other cooperatives?

[Dabrowski] Despite a large reduction in cow herds, milk production in recent years remains steady. This is due to the regular growth of milk yield. The average co-op cow gives about 3,000 liters a year, i.e., more than the national average. Genetic improvement of animals and a rise in the production of good-quality fodder has produced results. But we are not giants in total milk deliveries. In animal production our specialties are poultry, hogs and sheep. Every third egg and every third broiler chicken comes from RSP. However, low official prices on wool and difficulties with sales of mutton do not encourage sheep-breeding. That is why we reduced deliveries of this commodity last year.

[CHLOPSKA DROGA] You get your fodder mainly from your own feed-stores. And where do the fodder rawstuffs come from?

[Dabrowski] Improvements in agri-engineering, introduction of high-fertility, complex technologies, and good climate conditions, make it possible for co-op members to obtain better yields each year. During the recent harvests we gathered an average of 33.7 quintals of four-grains per hectare. This occurred despite a shortage of the basic means for production—fertilizers and pesticides. In addition, imported high-protein additives are needed to produce fodder. The limit on them prevents an even more drastic rise in production.

[CHLOPSKA DROGA] You can also achieve good production results thanks to the help of the state. The State Farms receive the largest subsidy per hectare, followed by the RSP, and then the peasant farms.

[Dabrowski] That depends on how you figure it. We believe that it is exactly the opposite. But that is not the point. In general, we must talk more about the fact that if farm subsidies are not increased, agriculture will come to a standstill, that food self-sufficiency will become problematical. Without modern chemistry, engineering and biotechnology, there will be no abundance of food. And those are the subsidies to production progress that we are concerned with. All others are secondary and trivial. With correct price-ratios and mechanisms, the present subsidies should not be needed either for the private farmer or for the co-op member.

[CHLOPSKA DROGA] Without the private farms you would have a hard time.

[Dabrowski] I would say more. Without private farms we would not have been formed. It is the land that the farmers have contributed that makes up the base for the formation of co-ops. Our form of management has offered and will offer the farmer easier work under better societal conditions, higher personal income, etc. It is very important that farmers have a favorable opinion of us and are interested in us. We are constantly striving for this through offers of cooperation, coproduction, mutual services, etc. Recently we went further, offering the farmers a new farm production cooperative statute



which relieves them of the obligation to contribute their assets and land to the cooperative. It sanctions further private farming and provides that the directions of production be determined collectively, that the division of receipts be according to individual input, etc. The first positive experiences of co-op members from Osnowa in Torun Voivodship and Cieslaw in Szczecin Voivodship give us reason to be optimistic.

[CHLOPSKA DROGA] Despite the fact that you have undertaken all kinds of action—from land cultivation to animal raising, production of fodder and finished food products, and ending with construction services, there is still a group of farm production co-ops which are cooperating at a loss.

[Dabrowski] Last year there were seven such co-ops. In 1988 there were 46, i.e., a fraction of a percent of the total number. It is a shame that they exist, but the reasons are very complex. Sometime the fault lies with the person, but the basic causes are unfavorable farming conditions, lack of production facilities and the ability to invest, circumstances of fate. And in this respect we differ in no way from agriculture as a whole. There are very good, good, and unfortunately bad, producers.

[CHLOPSKA DROGA] Towards the end of last year in over 50 percent of the co-ops earnings were lower than in the public sector. You will not entice youth with low pay.

[Dabrowski] One must look at the issue of earnings in agriculture differently than in other sectors of the national economy. In this respect, agriculture always was discriminated against, and not just on the issue of wages, but also on working conditions, social facilities, etc. Sad, but true. Therefore, in addition to remuneration, we are trying to help our members in some other way to maintain, insofar as possible, a good standard of living. One example is housing construction. Today we have a situation where the wait for housing, for our members, is no longer than 3 years. Another example—the high contributions to the social fund, the arranging of group meals and distribution of producer goods. We are concerned about working and living conditions. I believe that this produces results, because our membership is growing. In the last 4 years over 30,000 new members have decided to join the co-op, mainly young people. Every third member is no more than 35 years old.

[CHLOPSKA DROGA] If the RSP's have become self-dependent, self-managing and self-financing, if you have already implemented the assumptions of reform, then why is the Central Union maintained? After all, such an institution hampers the three S's.

[Dabrowski] The co-op members define the role and task of the Central Union. We are at the service of the co-ops and act in behalf of their interests. Our co-ops have complete self-dependence and the Union cannot hamper them in any way. It can only help and represent them. As to how long we will be needed, that too, will be decided by

the co-op members. That is why the press hubbub on the subject of co-op unions surprises us, and especially because this hubbub is being raised by everyone except co-op members.

[CHLOPSKA DROGA] What have the farm cooperatives learned in the past 40 years?

[Dabrowski] First of all, to count on themselves, their own resourcefulness and thrifty management. Thanks to this maxim, we have now created modern workshops and adequate living conditions for our members.

History has proven that when we do not interfere with cooperatives, when we do not order them to produce unprofitably, this sector can contribute a considerable amount of taxes to the state treasury and provide scarce goods and services to consumers. The co-op members themselves have learned enterpreneurship, especially in recent years. We undertake all work which brings a fair income, although we would prefer that this profitable work become the production of plants and animals and finished food products as quickly as possible.

#### Effects of 'Demonopolization' of Farm Products Procurement

26000188b Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish  
20 Oct 88 p 3

[Article by Augustyn Wos, director of the Institute of Agricultural Economy: "What About 'Demonopolizing' Procurement?"]

[Text] Procurement of agricultural products in the past was monopolized as much as other spheres of production and the market. The process of monopolization rested on two premises. First, the state assumed the responsibility for feeding the populace, in view of which it had to be in charge of the centralized distribution of food staples and controlled all of the more significant balances. Second, the monopolization of procurement became a part of the overall system of centralizing decisionmaking and management in the economy, which ruled out competition. By now both of these premises have ceased to be valid. Therefore, we are facing a general process of demonopolization [demonopolizacja] in the economy. I would be inclined to view this process as a logical consequence of the development and increasing complexity of the food economy. It emerged in a sort of objective manner, except that we came to understand this too late. Therefore, demonopolization is not yet another "incantation," but rather grows out of the new economic reality.

What does demonopolization in the sphere of procuring agricultural products actually mean? First, it means the cancellation of the responsibility of the government and its agencies for feeding the populace. This logical and inescapable consequence is not appreciated in current discussions. However, in actuality, demonopolization of procurement definitely entails such a consequence. This is a change with multiple and far-reaching results. Also,



it cannot be concealed that for some segments of the populace this new situation may turn out to be unfavorable, and will exacerbate the financial differentiation of society. In the long run, however, unfavorable consequences will abate, and individual groups adjust to the new situation created by the market. Undoubtedly, the market will create a new situation in the distribution of goods and income. Certainly, not everyone is going to be a winner. However, the market has an opportunity to unleash many creative forces that, by influencing production favorably, will indirectly affect the nutritional standard of the populace as well.

Second, if the demonopolization of procurement is not to remain a mere slogan, it should be organically coupled with demonopolizing the processing of agricultural materials. I consider this demonopolization to be even more important and primary. In the current discussions and preparatory work, including legislative, known to me, the issue is usually restricted solely to demonopolizing the procurement sector. This is interpreted as opening access to the agricultural market equally to all economic units. I do not by any means question the need for, and even the necessity of, such changes, but I want to point up that the favorable consequences of demonopolization in the procurement sector itself will be exhausted quickly if they do not find a logical continuation in the demonopolization of processing. Meanwhile, the main problem is exactly here, i.e., in processing and the food industry. After all, no particularly great interest in investing private, as well as foreign capital, in processing foods, especially staples, of standard grades is registered. The cause of this is rooted in the economics of processing. It is common knowledge that retail prices for food staples are set or otherwise controlled by the state. In addition, there is very strong social pressure for maintaining food prices at a relatively low level, which entails multibillion subsidies from the central budget. It is hard to expect that this pressure will weaken. Assessing the situation and its development in the foreseeable future realistically, it would be difficult to assume that the pressure on food prices from the populace will cease or even weaken considerably (barring the arrival in the market of goods efficiently competing for the zloty of income and the consumer).

By this I mean to say that the current structure of retail prices and the pressure for maintaining food prices at a low level will create a situation when food processing yields little profit. At present, regardless of budgetary subsidies, the food industry has one of the lowest profit margins (7 to 9 percent), which is absolutely insufficient for its technical modernization and development. The profitability of the food industry is one-third lower than that achieved in the entire manufacturing industry, and the profitability of producing basic food staples is at least one-half lower than the average level in the food industry. The not-so-high profit margin (about 12 percent) in the processing sectors in which we have relative equilibrium in the market (fruit and vegetables, fish, frozen foods, sugar and eggs and poultry) is noteworthy.

If the food industry were to modernize with its own resources under such conditions, it would need many decades to accomplish this. Given the current economic environment, it is hardly surprising that private and foreign capital is not eagerly invested in this industry. Unless there is an opportunity for food processing in small and medium-sized units to prosper, a mere demonopolization of procurement will bring very limited results. Therefore, the main issue is the system of setting prices for food staples, because these products rather than fruit and vegetables alone will determine whether the demonopolization of procurement becomes a genuine economic reality.

Certainly, there are many legislative problems involved here, but I think they are easier to cope with than a change in basic economic arrangements which will inevitably affect certain segments of the populace and will naturally give rise to conflicts. An exemplary and desirable solution could be achieved when retail prices for food would be shaped by a pure market form. As I have said, it is desirable, but not very realistic at present.

The idea about a connection between demonopolizing procurement and processing also follows from the fact that, as the experience of the world shows, agricultural products (raw materials) should be procured by those who process them. It is the responsibility of the processor to provide an adequate raw material base, and the array of forms of procurement is to be agreed between him and the farmers, or their organizations. In some cases, it can be deliveries on contracts (if products of adequate quality and standards, or deliveries strictly at the specified time are important for the processor). In other cases, this can be free purchasing of surpluses directly from farmers or through the brokerage of a specialized agency.

Summing up my thoughts on this issue, I want to stress once again that the heart of the problem we are now facing is in changing the overall economic arrangements in the sphere of food processing, with all the consequences thereof for the level of retail food prices, rather than in demonopolizing the procurement sector. This is not to say that I underestimate the eventual benefits of demonopolizing procurement under current economic arrangements. I only want to emphasize that these results will be limited and will be exhausted quickly. Therefore, the issue transcends the sphere of procuring agricultural products.

My next remark touches exactly on the benefits the demonopolization of procurement may yield in the absence of more profound changes in economic arrangements. To be sure, they are restricted, but they should not be disregarded, especially in the short run. Opening up the market to all entrepreneurs without exception (private individuals, companies, foundations, associations, etc.) will give the farmer the right to choose a partner who either offers a higher price or ensures other favorable conditions. On the other hand, a certain counterbalance for the present-day potentates will emerge.



This new situation may not break the existing monopoly right away, but it will pose a threat, the influence of which on the overall conditions may be sobering. Our economy is "starved" for competition, and any form of it may have a favorable influence on the course of adaptation processes.

The current discussions in some circles involve almost exclusively splitting (breaking up) the existing monopolies in the procurement sector. Such discussions are not unimportant. Certainly, we should consider whether some monopoly structures should be eliminated "by decree." However, operations whereby new economic organisms emerge at the grassroots level and "break up" the monopoly by the very fact of their existence are, to my mind, more in line with the spirit of the time. It is important that the greatest possible number of new companies be set up, which would channel free capital, human initiative and enterprise into the sector of procurement and processing of agricultural raw materials. I believe this to be the most important move.

Over [several] decades, we have created the macrostructure of large food processing enterprises, to which the monopolistic structure of procurement was subordinated. This structure, inefficient in its current form, should be augmented and reinforced by small and medium-size units, which are more flexible and adjust easier to the requirements of the market, as well as operate at a lower outlay. However, the issue is how to generate the interest in the food economy and agricultural markets on the part of private and foreign capital. Some might say that new legal regulations and a more judicious tax policy are needed. Certainly so. These are truly important matters. However, personally I believe that changes in the overall economic arrangements, including the rules for setting retail food prices, are the most important. Only profound changes in this area can create stable and favorable conditions for the expansion of initiatives and entrepreneurship in the sector of procuring and processing agricultural raw materials.

## ROMANIA

### Need for Improved Airline Passenger Service

27000026 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian  
18 Nov 88 p 5

[Article by Cristina Popescu: "TAROM Services and Passenger Needs"]

[Text] The fast pace of modern life has made the airplane increasingly necessary as a means of transportation, with airlines linking the remotest areas of the globe and carrying millions of passengers to their destinations in minimal time. So it is that the airplane has rapidly made its way into daily life, becoming an important element in planning for travel by various kinds of passengers, either for personal purposes or on official business.

We discussed certain aspects of public interest in the services offered by TAROM [Romanian Air Transport] and the problems that crop up from day to day and which must be resolved promptly and with care, with Florea Niculescu, head of the Bucharest TAROM agency, and Tatiana Vasile, head of the marketing department.

Airline travel is becoming increasingly popular and the facilities offered by the various agencies have to be constantly diversified to meet customer demand. New airports are opened and faster and more direct links are established between terminal points. We may say that all areas of activity benefit in effect from the additional certainty in honoring of contracts resulting from development of this system of transportation. The TAROM agency, that is, the airline acting through its agencies, provides connections by air to the most important districts of the country, by way of 16 major airports, primarily those of Bucharest, Caransebes, Timisoara, Satu Mare, Botosani, Iasi, and Constanta, as well as connections abroad to 36 major centers on all continents by scheduled flights. The complex activities of the agency involve primarily reservation of seats and establishment of the flight connections and the routes which are most convenient from the viewpoint of the passenger. The business of the agency is conducted in two sections, the domestic traffic and the international traffic departments.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] First let us talk about some of the more common services to stress the priority objectives of this public activity.

[Niculescu] The activities of the domestic traffic department are much more extensive than a simple analysis would show. There is more to them than simply issuing tickets. We have made certain that this particular operation proceeds smoothly by opening several ticket windows with the various zones distributed proportionately among them on the basis of the average passenger inflow. This avoids crowding and needless discussions, and the clerk can provide all the information needed about a particular flight. Similarly, the clerk is responsible for promptly relaying messages about passenger traffic on domestic flights, making reservations requested from abroad on different flights and connections, and making connections between domestic and foreign flights requested by passengers. We are trying to organize a new type of service for our agencies which will allow us to accept requests for establishing routes and flight agreements, requests made by telephone from any city in Romania, with no need for the requester to be present. This is actually only one of the reasons for combining the two departments, domestic and foreign, to form a single unit operating at a single location. But until this project is carried out we will continue to take steps to provide better services for the traveling public and to give passengers correct information on the flights they wish to take, the time of departure, and the time at which they should come to the airport, and also to make certain that



accurate, correct information is provided by the telephone service. We emphasize these details, elementary concepts of discipline, because we know that arrival at the airport at the correct time is very important in carrying out a flight from the very beginning, so that time may be reserved for the other activities preceding take-off.

[ROMANIA LIBERA] In what other directions is the agency taking action?

[Niculescu] We try at all times to make certain that every flight is booked to the maximum. As a result of these efforts, more than 16,000 more passengers were able to avail themselves of this form of travel in 1988 than in 1987 with no change in the number of flights, including additionally organized flights, to spend their vacation or legal holidays on the coast or in Northern Moldavia. Of course, we also face many problems in our work relating to personnel qualifications, providing prompt and considerate service for each individual passenger, the lack of skilled personnel for the telex service, and, as I pointed out earlier, an unsuitable location.

[Vasile] We should not forget that significant achievements have been made by our coworkers in the international traffic department. The figures in this area are impressive. The target figure for number of passengers has been exceeded by 111 percent during the first 9 months of 1988. Services are improving in this department as well. There is a heavier demand for these services and we train personnel for them every year; in fact we train personnel in more than one skill. In the 4th quarter of 1988 we will introduce a computerized reservation system. This system has been tested for 1 and 1/2 years now and we have trained some of our own people to operate it, especially since the automated reservation system is to be extended to the TAROM agencies abroad and is to be connected to other automated reservation systems. To draw a parallel between the activities of the international and the domestic travel departments, I should point out that we also have a ticket issue office at which passengers are given instructions regarding departure, compliance with customs laws, and the possibility of getting to the airport by means of a special bus which leaves the office on Brezoianu Street hourly. This office can also handle requests coming from the Mendelev Street agency. We also have a complete service window, one at which rates are determined and the route most convenient for the passenger and the company is worked out, and a space reservation window. These are points of intensive activity involving the public, where we must demonstrate highly professional behavior and, once again, where our services must always be characterized by considerate, prompt, and respectful treatment of the persons soliciting these services. Breaches of the code of conduct are punished in proportion to their seriousness and are gone over with the other personnel. I should like to mention the names of some of our coworkers who have made themselves conspicuous for excellence in their daily activities: Florica Duta, Adriana Ionescu,

Maria Kaszoni, and Georgeta Pantea. We hope that they will be joined by others. I should also mention the persons who are to work in the recently established special telephone services providing up-to-date information. It can be called up to make or confirm reservations and in some cases to cancel orders. In providing this service we hope to accommodate our travellers by optimizing the operation of each department and by giving our personnel specialized training.

#### **Efforts To Increase Coal Production in Jiu Valley** 27000025 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 19 Nov 88 p 3

[Article by I. Cojocaru: "Firm Action in the Jiu Valley To Increase Coal Production"]

[Text] The miners of the Jiu Valley are very familiar with the call for production of as much coal as possible for the country. Many of them respond with praiseworthy feats of labor, and the collectives supplement their efforts. As we know, workers of the Paroseni Mining Enterprise have earned the exalted title of Hero of Socialist Labor, and some miners in other parts of the Jiu Valley have won this high title because of their exceptional accomplishments in the struggle for coal. Especially successful at the present time are the miners of Lonea, who also initiated the competition for 1988 in the area of underground coal mining. Part of the achievements in the great Jiu Valley coal basin were pointed out at the general meeting of worker representatives from units of the integrated mining complex. The activities of the Lonea, Petrila-sud, and Paroseni collectives were stressed, but it was also noted in the report drawn up that serious unplanned shortfalls exist and that this situation is not due merely to objective factors. Some of the participants in the discussions remarked that much progress has been made in modernizing mining and improving living conditions in the localities in the Petrosani Basin, because of the measures taken by the party leadership and personally by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu. On the occasion of a public meeting held in Petrosani, the party secretary general stated, "Let us make the Jiu Valley not only a strong mining center, but also a worker center with model living and working conditions." Many problems have been solved in the meantime and others are receiving the attention of party and state authorities. The Jiu Valley mines have been outfitted with a large number of complex, power-driven mine face working machines and other high-output equipment. There is now talk increasingly of power-driven complexes of great height, working of coal along faces with an artificial load-bearing ceiling, or other modern equipment and technologies. After the 9th Congress of the party billions of lei were invested in modernizing mining and improving living conditions. In 1988, 922 apartments were assigned to miners and nearly 10,000 workers in mining units received the wage increases provided by law, at the recommendation of the party secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu.



The participants in the meeting of workers' representatives contrasted the new living and working conditions created during our years with the obligations of the Jiu Valley miners. The production of coal mined in 1988 with power-driven equipment amounted to only 77 percent of the target figure, and the cutter-loader utilization factor was entirely unsuitable. The inadequate use of power-driven equipment is one of the main causes of the shortfall. Work brigade leader and miner Costica Ene of the Lupeni mine informed the meeting that he and his fellow workers had exceeded the daily target figure by 4,500 tons of coking coal. This success is due largely to the brief period of only 25 days required for recycling a power-driven complex. The Lupeni Mining Enterprise has in fact acquired good experience in "rotation" of power-driven complexes. This experience has not been widely applied as needed, however, because in some instances there has been a lack of initiative, while in others the necessary material resources have not been provided. In this connection, specialists of the Jiu Valley integrated mining enterprise recently calculated that at least 30 power-driven complexes and 36 cutter-loaders must be operated to full capacity in 1989, and each power-driven complex must daily yield an average output of 480 tons of coal. To reach these levels it is necessary to lengthen the period of operation of the complexes between repairs, reduce the time required for moving from one working face to another, and avoid unscheduled shutdowns. In effect, it is necessary to avoid deficiencies present in the past. This can be accomplished only by improving work and by improving supply of materials and equipment.

Extensive discussion, in a spirit of criticism and self-criticism, was devoted at the meeting to the need for reaching the output targets as quickly as possible in new shaft and strip mines and for improvement in research and preparatory activities. The miners' representatives clearly outlined what the miners must do, but they also recommended that the comrades in the management of the integrated enterprise and the ministry provide more assistance in supply of materials and equipment.

One of the priority problems in Jiu Valley is procurement and efficient use of human resources. We have pointed out elsewhere that there are mining teams which set records and others which fail to fulfill the plan. Brigade leader Stefan Alba of the Petrila Mining Enterprise stated at the meeting that he and his fellow workers mined more than 70,000 tons of coal beyond the target figure for the first 10 months of the year. He made it clear that this success is due to the measures taken to strengthen discipline and apply new operating technologies on a large scale. "I am convinced," this famous miner said, "that we will also meet our obligation well in 1989." After reporting that the miners under his management substantially exceeded their production pledge for 1988, engineer Viorel Boanta, director of the Lonea Mining Enterprise, said that "we are resolved to keep on increasing coal production and to improve quality. Our miners know that the country needs more and better coal."

Hence the leading Jiu Valley workers spoke of their accomplishments and their concerns, with their heads held high. Others, however, were forced to talk about arrears and obligations. This was the situation facing Cornel Schreter, director of the Valea de Brazi Mining Enterprise, Ioan Dabulean, director of the Aninoasa Mining Enterprise, Vasile Pupezan, chairman of the Vulcan Mining Enterprise Workers' Council, Ioan Cornea, chairman of the union committee at the Dilja Mining Enterprise, Nicolae Vilcea of the Jiu Valley Coal Dressing Enterprise, and others. It is important to note that firm resolve to increase coal production was expressed in the discussions.

The plan of measures adopted by the general meeting also offers guarantees that better results will be obtained. It should not be forgotten, however, that measures were established on other occasions but that some of them were not fully carried out, so that lags in coal production occurred constantly. The potential for increasing production and efficiency has been reexamined in recent weeks at all mines in the Jiu Valley. The measures recommended locally and at the general meeting must be applied with maximum efficiency. Strengthening of order and discipline at all mining units in this large coal basin must be accompanied by improvement in the system of cooperation among miners, geologists, planning and design personnel, and suppliers of equipment and materials. If all the elements involved in the struggle for coal meet their obligations in an exemplary manner, in 1989 the miners of Jiu Valley will be able to respond with honor to the call to give the country as much coal as possible.

## YUGOSLAVIA

### University Students Suffer High Rents, Substandard Lodging

#### Few Pristina Dormitories

28000041b Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian  
8 Nov 88 pp 71-72

[Article by Iso Rusi: "Let Us Be Realistic; We Are Living the Impossible"]

[Text] At first glance, the troubles of students who are subletting at Pristina University are almost identical to the poverty-stricken circumstances of their counterparts at all Yugoslav universities. Yet it seems that the students studying at this university do have certain particular features of their own. Unfortunately, the bill for that is again presented to them. Pristina University has about 18,000 full-time students. Most have come from elsewhere. Only about 4,200 of them can count on housing in the five dormitories and the three fair-sized barracks managed by the Student Center here. The rest get by as best they can. There are also those who commute everyday from nearby towns and live with relatives and friends, but the number who must rent from private landlords is incomparably the largest. There are not



many landlords in Pristina, and what is rented out is usually substandard. The perfect market mechanism (a characteristic which all university centers in the country have in common) operates so that the scant supply and immense demand result in astronomical prices. A bed in a shed, almost always dilapidated, and with an outdoor toilet costs 10 million old dinars. The rent is twice as high in rooms that are a bit more decent, while those who can allow themselves a bachelor's or one-room apartment pay at least 150 or 200 marks for that pleasure. It goes without saying, and this is the custom everywhere on the subletting market, that payment is made at least 6 months in advance. Utilities are all extra (electricity, water, and—most welcome—heat).

The landlords in Pristina have introduced an innovation of their own: when payment is made for electric power, the highest rate per kilowatt is always charged the subtenant. It does not need to be said that the scant supply of beds offered by Pristina's landlords are mainly of poor quality and they cannot meet the student demand even in suburban settlements. For instance, it is difficult to find lodgings even in Kosovo Polje. As for "house rules," everyone knows: no visitors, subtenants are expected to be "invisible and inaudible" and to be obsequiously grateful for the privilege of having a bed at all. Even in Pristina there are those lucky enough to have houses outside the city to live in, and they pack university students into their city apartments like sardines. The beds are the only furniture in such apartments. It is said not to be a rarity, and some even say that it is the rule, that these apartments are social property.

Informed people say that even the immense number of new students enrolling (9,000 freshmen this year, which is 14 percent fewer than last year) has no decisive effect on the high rents. Pristina students who are from elsewhere mention as the main source of their troubles the virtual invasion of Greek students who have transferred to Pristina after the decision of their government not to recognize degrees from Skopje and Bitola universities (supposedly because instruction is in a language not recognized). They say that there are now about 1,500 of them here. They have foreign exchange, they skim the cream on the subletting market, while others must pay prices far beyond their means. There were foreigners at Pristina University even earlier, but they were not so numerous and they paid "normal rents." The Greeks and the richest students can allow themselves the best rooms and beds in the settlements Dragodan (detached private houses), Suncani Breg, and Dardanija, and even in the famous Peyton Place (private houses opposite the Pristina Journalism Center). And everyone knows that personal incomes in Kosovo, but also in Montenegro and Macedonia (which supply all of 2,800 university students in Pristina, almost all of them subletting), are the lowest in the country. Scholarships and student loans share the same fate; in Yugoslavia, they bring up the ignominious rear. That is why the luckiest here are those who can obtain lodging in the facilities of the Student Center. Most of its total capacity consists of three-bed

and four-bed rooms. Food and lodging cost 64,000 dinars. An amount for which the others could only dream of getting a park bench! Another datum that is not without significance: the facilities of the Student Center in Pristina are far better than their counterparts in Skopje. The first and oldest dormitory was built 17 years ago, the last only 5 years ago. It is also possible here, if you do not have a bed in the dormitory, at least to use the student dining hall (the price is 70 percent of those 64,000). The students who live in the Student Center again pay 30 percent of the economic price, the rest comes from the provincial Self-Managed Community of Interest for Targeted Education. These prices are in effect until the end of the year, and then there will be an adjustment. The people at the Student Center hope that this will not affect the students too much and that most of the increase will be absorbed by the Self-Managed Community of Interest.

The lucky ones are chosen by committees in the various schools of the university. Here again the student service has no influence in allotting the places. The rector's office makes the overall distribution among schools. The number of unauthorized tenants is at the level of the Yugoslav average (a fifth of those who are authorized). The estimate is that they number between 700 and 800 here. Jashanica, who has just become director of the center and who previously was the leader of Kosovo's youth, told us that when they cannot do anything against them, then they at least like to know who they are and even give them mattresses and bed linen if they need it. Jashanica feels that it would be best if the Zagreb formula is adopted and housing is allotted for 4 years instead of each academic year. Then the students would take better care of the furniture and they would have a motivation to perform better in school so as to not lose their place in the dormitory. Because the housing is distributed late, the facilities are not filled although they have been ready since 1 October. The center has to pay for that from its treasury although it is not to blame. We also heard in Pristina that the house rules in the facilities of the center are strict (the facility is locked up at 2200 hours, guests are not allowed, some jokingly explain that the reason for this is that the pornographic film "True Passions" has been showing at a Pristina moviehouse for 3 months). But at the center they say that that simply is not true. Some students are not satisfied with the job done by cleaning personnel. Litter is nothing rare, not only in other parts of the city, but also in the lobbies and corridors of most buildings in Pristina, and they say that they have hot water only twice a week. But Jashanica says that all of these are a particular concern.

Interethnic relations in Kosovo are what they are. We were interested in how they were among students living in the center. The breakdown of students in dormitories and the barracks is 81 percent Albanian, 8.2 percent Serb and Montenegrin, 8.5 percent Muslim, 0.4 percent Turk, the rest miscellaneous. It is specifically emphasized that the percentage of Serbs and Montenegrins is 2 percent higher than last year and that their share will be higher



when the facilities are filled to capacity. There are about 200 rooms in the Student Center in which the students represent a mix of nationalities. The director emphasizes the stable interethnic situation in the center. There have been no incidents in the center's facilities since 1981, they say. It was also said that there is simply no way of standing in the way of private landlords and their power. Two years ago, the Student Center set up a bureau, which was supposed to bring landlords together and through which subletting students were supposed to find places. Although landlords are offered incentives in the form of tax deductions, there were no results. The bureau placed only some 200 students. The landlords are safe, since the inspectors cannot do anything to them (there is almost no checking, and the penalties for offenders are symbolic). At the same time, if the bureau did function, which the center itself cannot make happen, the landlords would not be able to rent rooms which have not been certified (the minimum calls for accommodations with the use of the bathroom and toilet), which is mostly what is done now.

#### Boycotts at Titograd

28000041b Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian  
8 Nov 88 p 72

[Article by Milka Tadic: "Boycotted Standard of Living"]

[Text] This uneasy Montenegrin autumn would probably have been somewhat more quiet if the students had not joined the workers in front of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro in making demands for a life that is a bit more decent. The student boycott of food in the dining halls of the dormitories at Veljko Vlahovic University, which lasted more than a week, and numerous rallies have only heightened more the drama of the moment. On the day when the 17th Meeting of the LCY Central Committee was held, the students decided to terminate the "hunger strike" as a sign of support for the Central Committee. However, many of them say that by no means signifies that they are giving up the fight to have their demands met. For the moment, through their delegates in the legal institutions of the system.

As for the student standard of living and their living conditions, it is no wonder that the students went to the streets this October. That is, for a long time the republic authorities have been warned that something of the kind could happen. At a protest rally in the Rifat "Trso" Burdovic Student Dormitory, slightly more than a year ago, at which the chairman of the republic Executive Council, Vuko Vukadinovic, was present, the students vigorously demanded improvement of their standard of living and equalization of the status of academic citizens of Montenegro with their counterparts from other republics. That rally, like many previous ones, ended with empty promises.

Even today, Montenegro has the lowest level of student loans in the country. Until recently, they averaged 25,000 dinars, not even enough to cover the costs of food

and lodging in the dormitories. The loans were recently increased and range from 60,000 to 100,000, but the prices of services in the dormitories have risen, so that today room and board cost 75,000 dinars. As our free education becomes more and more expensive (the registration fee at some of the schools of Titograd University amounted to more than 100,000 dinars for full-time students, which is not even to mention the prices of books), it is clear that it is hard for students to survive on that kind of income. For a long time, they have figured out various ways of earning a few dinars more. The lines in front of the Student Service Center are longer and longer. But since the supply is greater than the demand even on this manpower market, money is often earned illegally. This petty smuggling (selling articles from Italy and Turkey) is an additional source of income for the students.

Two dormitories in Titograd (known popularly as the Old and New ones) have seen better days. It was almost intolerable to live in the Old Dormitory until this year, when a great deal of money was spent for its renovation. But reconstruction of the dormitory has not yet been finished, so that this fall the students prepared for examinations amid the rumble of construction machines. Unfortunately, even after reconstruction it will not be possible to work here under normal conditions, since one of the three wings of this dormitory has been turned over to apprentices. The apprentice dormitory in Titograd has been closed down this year because it was dilapidated, and almost all the rooms have been converted to quadruples. Students here are still dreaming about reading rooms, although there has been talk for a long time now about providing space for studying.

About 900 students have managed to get places in dormitories this year. Some 200 of them failed to obtain the least expensive bed in the city. Since many of them cannot pay for the expensive private lodgings, the Presidium of the University Conference has been trying to solve this problem. One of the ideas is to put up the students in dormitories in Cetinje and Niksic which are not filled to capacity. Since these towns are about 40 km or so from Titograd, it is not difficult to imagine the effort required for this daily commute. To be sure, transportation is free, so that is not charged to the student pocketbook, which is already skimpy.

However, it is better to travel than to pay for lodgings whose rents have been rising at a dizzying rate with every passing day. The dinar has not been the means of payment for these lodgings for a long time either in Titograd or other cities of the country. Most students going to school in Titograd come from the poor north of the republic, where average personal incomes amount to some 20 million old dinars, so that this year those who have not obtained places in the dormitory will probably "go illegal." The president of the youth organization in the Rifat "Trso" Burdovic Dormitory says that he will follow the lead of Belgrade and Zagreb in attempting to register the "illegals." This allotment of beds will most probably be legal, so that those students "without rights"



will obtain all those rights held by their colleagues who have regularly obtained places in the dormitory.

By all appearances, the students are only sharing the fate of Montenegro, whose economy has for a long time been unable to cover even simple reproduction. It is no

wonder that this republic's university students, who work under impossible conditions, have had a poor record as to the average time required to obtain their degree. At some of the engineering faculties the average even exceeds 10 years.



## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

**VCR's Impact on Czech Cultural Life Noted**  
24000031 Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech  
24 Nov 88 p 1

[Article: "Video Center of Attention"]

[Text] These days, when our country is proceeding on the way to sweeping social restructuring, in connection with changes in the economic system there are also changes taking place in the superstructure, especially in the cultural sphere. Art as a specific form reflecting reality has its unique place in societal movements, and artistic fields that have a mass impact and thus also the greatest influence on the social consciousness are naturally taking the lead in gaining public interest.

Therefore, it is no wonder that at the present time there is much discussion about the audiovisual media, about the influence of film, television, and video. A motivating factor for so much attention being directed to this issue was the sharp drop in movie attendance noted here last year. Among the main reasons and causes for this, besides long-standing problems, is first and foremost the appeal of that new audiovisual medium, the video recorder.

After the turn of the period at the end of the seventies, when video tapes of better technical quality and more accessible prices flooded Western markets, video quickly began to penetrate also the socialist countries. At the present time, in spite of the problems of availability, high purchase price, and other limiting factors, approximately 6 percent of households here own VCR's. But, hand in hand with the appearance of VCR's, there are also problems arising. One cannot ignore the fact that the leading factor in the dissemination of videocassettes is, meantime, the wealth of supplies found on the black market. According to the estimates of experts, there are approximately 3,000 titles available, encompassing the broadest spectrum of genres—from pornfilms, shots full of brutality, and other pure junk to renowned works of worldwide cinematography that unfortunately never got

to the screens of our movie theaters. In connection with the existence of an alternative black market there is also violation of copyright law No 35/1965 of SBIRKA, especially paragraph 15, which permits reproduction for private use but not for unauthorized undertakings or unfair competition. There are already cases recorded of the prosecution of citizens who made copies of imported video cassettes or musical films for purposes of speculative sale.

Since in this whole matter we want to guard against the consequences arising from civil rights and criminal law responsibility, it is essential to successfully direct the rampant spread of unofficial exchanges by establishing our own videoclubs, videocafes, and, especially, video rental libraries offering a quantity of high quality titles and a corresponding quantity of recorded cassettes. This is also how the Central Film Lending Library [UPF] is directing its activity by organizing a network of lending libraries all over the republic. By 1991 it should have a stock of approximately 1,000 titles of domestic and foreign origin that would be distinguished as a resource of our own works as well as quality transcriptions, dubbings, and captions. Regarding the contents, in the view of the UPF management all worthwhile films can be bought abroad, films that are not pornographic, do not advocate violence, and are not against the socialist system.

Growing prognoses indicate that at the beginning of the nineties the market should be sufficiently saturated with recorded videocassettes and with a corresponding availability of VCR's, and video should cease being considered such a sensation here. At this time we can also expect a leveling off of attendance at movies whose programs will be supplemented by those of video libraries. Just as in the past the phonograph did not draw audiences away from concert halls, the movies did not destroy the theater and television has not been able to replace the movies, so video will not replace film and television productions in the future. But the specific characteristics of these arts will be defined, new boundaries between them will be delineated, and new mutual relations and new programs of activity will be established.



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